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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The rapid deregulation of the electricity industry in the last two decades has produced the 
formation of several markets around the world. Following the example of other 
commodities, the electricity market is commonly managed by an exchange that publishes 
daily the traded quantities and the market prices. Unfortunately, electricity cannot be 
exchange freely but has to be traded subject to the physical constraints of the transmission 
network. In addition, electricity cannot be stored as any other commodity but it is necessary 
to consume it at the same time of productions. These peculiar characteristics of the 
electricity market have been deeply investigated in the last decades and new technologies 
developed. The research included in this thesis started with the first steps of the 
deregulation in Japan. The necessities for new tools both in the market management side 
and in the market participant side were the impulse to develop the new theories summarized 
in this work. 
 
1.1  The deregulation process 
 
The earliest introduction of market concepts and privatization to electric power systems 
took place in Chile in the late 70s. The Chilean model was generally perceived as 
successful in bringing rationality and transparency to power pricing, but it contemplated the 
continuing dominance of several large incumbents and suffered from the attendant 
structural problems. Argentina improved the Chilean model by imposing strict limits on 
market concentration and by improving the structure of payments to units held in reserve to 
assure system reliability. One of the principal purposes of the introduction of market 
concepts in Argentina was to privatize existing generation assets (which had fallen into 
disrepair under the government-owned monopoly, resulting in frequent service 
interruptions) and to attract capital needed for rehabilitation of those assets and for system 
expansion. The World Bank was active in introducing a variety of hybrid markets in other 
Latin American nations, including Peru, Brazil and Colombia, during the 90s, with limited 
success. 
In the late 80s, the English Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher developed a policy based on 
minimum state intervention, free markets, and entrepreneurialism. After the election in 
1983, the Government sold off most of the large utilities including the electricity generation 
sector in 1990. With the privatization of the generation sector, the creation of an 
independent company that owns and operates the transmission grid and the market, the UK 
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model was a key event in the electricity market development.  
Following the UK example, several other countries approached the same process either if in 
different ways. 
The most famous examples include: 
Norway: 1991  
Sweden: 1996 
USA: 1996 (Order 888,889) 
Australia: 1995 
The European Union deliberated the first directive about the deregulation of the electricity 
market in the member countries in the 1996; the directive was revised in 2003.  
The objective of deregulation and privatization is to increase the efficiency and 
sustainability of the energy sector through the competition. Increasing the number of 
entities competing in the energy industry, governments aim to develop an environment that 
dynamically adjusts to the customers needs and increases the total welfare.  
 
1.2  Electricity pricing 
 
In the past, it was commonly thought that electricity could not be managed properly under 
market forces. High costs for infrastructures and complexity of real time operation were 
considered the barriers to a complete electricity market; a single monopolistic company that 
operates under regulated condition was considered the most efficient way to manage the 
electricity industries. The introduction of deregulations in the bank, telecommunication and 
other political strategic sectors, shows that it was feasible to privatize and operate markets 
either in sectors that were classically considered natural monopolies.  
The macroeconomic theory of the intersection between the offers and demand was applied 
to the electricity and it was shown that efficiency in the electricity market could be obtained 
with the introduction of the market.  
In the late ‘80s Schweppy formalized the theory of the spot pricing of electricity, showing 
that it is feasible to price electricity in real time, in opposition to the classical theories, that 
claim that the electricity price have to be decided on a long term cost base calculation. 
Schweppy demonstrated that the marginal cost of the generation production is applicable 
for electricity pricing inducing efficient macro behavior in both the supplying and the 
demand side of the industry. The possibility to price electricity on spot base was a 
fundamental condition for the development of the market, and Schweppy’s work gave an 
important impulse to the deregulation policy of United States.  
It was demonstrated that the benefit that may be earned from the marginal pricing could 
ensure a profit rate sufficient to justify investments in the generation sector. The marginal 
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pricing theory substitutes the average price theory for electricity pricing. 
    
1.3  New entities and players in the power industry 
 
Changing from a monopolistic schema, in which the public or private utility is in charge to 
follow all the chain process from generation, to transmission, until the deliver to the final 
customers of electricity, to a competitive environment took in place several organization 
problems and structural discussions. 
It is generally recognized that the electricity business can be divided in 4 main parts: 
• Generation 
• Transmission  
• Distribution 
• Retail 
Customers are the final entities in the value chain.  
Generation sector has the role to produce electricity from other energy fonts such as nuclear, 
thermal and hydro. Once the electricity is produced, it has to be transmitted via the high 
voltage transmission lines from the production location to the consumption location. To 
distribute the electricity to final customers a low voltage network (the distribution network) 
is normally employed. The retail sector role includes contracts management, customers care 
billing and settlement functions.    
Either after the deregulation, the transmission and distribution businesses (also defined as 
the wire business) are recognized as natural monopolies. In other words, it can be said that 
it is necessary to have a single company owning the network for a fixed area. The network 
can be operated by an entity that does not own it. Since the network is utilized by the 
companies that are operating in the generation and the retail business, it is fundamental that 
the network operator is an independent entity capable of ensuring fairness and clearness of 
the utilization of the network itself.  
The necessity to have a monopolistic transmission company is a consequence of the 
importance to optimize the network configuration and avoid inefficient constructions. 
Transmission and distribution entities are in general regulated companies with a 
pre-negotiated return on equity. Recently, the phenomenon of merchant transmission 
companies is increasing for special projects such as DC interconnection between control 
areas. These projects are not subject to regulation and can be very profitable in condition of 
highly congested areas. 
The generation and the retail sector are the parts of the electricity industry that are generally 
privatized and deregulated. The introduction of the competition and the consequent 
possibility of profit for new entries are the incentive for the creation of new companies and 
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to attract new capitals from investors. 
The generation market, also defined as the wholesale market, is normally the first sector of 
the electricity industry to be deregulated. IPPs (independent power producers), merchant 
generators or generation companies are the new players that enter in the wholesale market. 
IPPs are generating units built after the stipulation of long-term contracts: PPA (power 
purchase agreement). The IPP owner reduces the investment risk with a contract that insure 
the recovery of the monetary exposure; merchant generators are projects that relies on the 
market or short term contract for the recover of the investments. IPPs were strongly 
encouraged by governments and politicians in the late 80s. The objective was the 
development of an environment that may be easily adapted to the competition schema.  
The retail side of the market is in general deregulated by steps and in a second time respect 
the wholesale market. The main reason is the protection of small electricity customers from 
the risks of the market. In the first step large customers are enable to choose the supplier 
and enter directly in the wholesale market. In this stage, local distribution companies or 
other regulated entities such a ‘single buyer’ are responsible for supplying the electricity 
service to not-eligible customers. In a second stage, when the wholesale market is mature, 
all the retail market is open to competition. At this point several entities such as retail 
companies, aggregators, and energy service providers enter in the market.  
The wholesale market can be operated on a bilateral way or on central way. The advantage 
to have a central market is the possibility to have a clear price signal to the market 
participants. 
The introduction of the market is also an incentive for brokers or traders to enter in the 
electricity business. Traders and brokers have an important role in the development of a 
mature market: they ensure liquidity and information availability for other players. 
Figure 1 is a schematic description of the relation among players and entities in a 
deregulated electric industry. The dot lines represents the contracts and the money flow; the 
continuous lines show the flow of electricity. Generation sector utilizes the transmission 
and distribution network to deliver electricity to the final customers. The monetary 
transactions may occur among generation sector, retail sector, traders and market structures. 
The transmission system operator collects the market information (the orange line) to 
ensure the physical delivery of the electricity.   
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Figure 1: Entities in the deregulated market 
 
1.4  Information technologies applied to the power system 
 
The improvement of information technologies and communication networks needs a special 
mention. It has to be recognized that the development of efficient electricity markets was 
strongly supported by IT infrastructure. The increase of entities involved in the electricity 
business is the cause of an increase of information exchange among them and an enormous 
quantity of data that have to be processed daily. Production and consumption have to be 
monitored on a very short-term period (from one hour to fifteen minutes depending on the 
country) for settlement proposes. This big amount of data have to be acquired trough an 
information network, validated and processed in relative short time.  
Power exchanges have to acquire a large amount of bids and offers and to process them 
trough complex calculation to obtain market solutions in few minutes.  
Power system operators have to collect plans and schedules of all the generators to forecast 
the power flow on the transmission lines and to ensure a safe and efficient transmission 
network operation.  
In the last three decades, computer and communication costs decreased constantly and at 
the same time performance increased. The progress in computer science permitted to 
utilized high performance computer equipment to store and process data, Internet is the 
basic infrastructure for electricity trading and information exchange, and the improvement 
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of software development had allowed market players and system operators to acquire 
sophisticated calculation tools at reasonable prices. 
This thesis proposes solutions for the deregulated market assuming that the IT and 
communication infrastructures are available and efficiently operating; the algorithms 
developed were translated in computer programs and tested. 
 
1.5 The Japanese situation 
 
The Japanese electricity industry was operated by 10 regional private monopolistic utilities. 
Japan approaches the deregulation of the electricity industry at the end of the 90s. The first 
step was the introduction of IPPs: several companies offer to build and operate power 
plants and to sell the power production to the regional utilities for a pre-determinate price. 
IPPs contracts vary between 10 to 15 years. The introduction of IPPs became the bases for 
the development of a competitive framework for the wholesale market. In 2000, the retail 
market was partially open. New entities called PPS (Power Producer and Supplier) could 
supply electricity to large customers (2000 kW or above) such as factories or commercial 
buildings. In general, the PPSs buy electricity from independent generators or co-generators 
and use the utility transmission network to transmit it to their customers. PPSs pay a 
transmission fee to the utilities for accessing the network. 
In 2004 the eligibility criteria to be supplied by PPS was enlarged to medium-large size 
customers (500 kW), and subsequently, in 2005 to medium size customers (50kW) allowing 
retail competition in the 63% of the total market. The full deregulation of the retail market, 
including the residential customers, is now under discussion and may be implemented in 
the future. 
In addition of the reconstructing of the retail market, several other reforms, including the 
introduction of a power exchange and the development of an organization that coordinate 
the transmission access, were done. 
In December 2007, the Japanese electricity industry is characterized by the presence of 10 
monopolistic utilities still vertical integrated, more than 25 PPSs that supply the 3% of the 
retail market, several IPPs that supply electricity to the utilities, one large generation 
company, J-power, that operates around 10% of the total generation capacity of Japan, a 
power exchange (JEPX) that operate a forward and a day-ahead market, and an independent 
transmission access coordinator (ESCJ). Figure 2 shows a schematic representation of the 
entities operating in the Japanese electricity industry and their relation. Japanese utilities 
transmission networks are interconnected by inter-tie line, for this reason it is possible to 
have a single Japanese electricity market. 
This research and algorithms developed in this thesis are based on the Japanese market 
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model and the needs of Japanese market participants. 
 
 
Figure 2: Entities in the Japanese electricity industry 
 
1.6  Research objective 
 
The changes in the electric industry are the cause of several problems and challenges for 
both the new market players and the utilities. The increasing of entities operating in the 
market implicates a distributed decision making process and, as consequences, the 
necessity of coordination or to take decision under impartial or imperfect information 
conditions. 
In this thesis, after a deep investigation of the market models and rules, I shall focus on 
three main problems that are particularly relevant for the Japanese players. 
The first subject is the development of strategic bidding decision for generation companies. 
The complexity of the market rules and the operation constraints of power plants make the 
bidding development process non-trivial. Market price forecasting method and unit 
commitment optimization techniques are developed and integrated to find the strategic bid 
that maximize the generation company profit. 
To support PPS decision making, a day-ahead scheduling method for generation and 
demand portfolio that consider the possibility to supply electricity in several control areas is 
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proposed. 
Another fundamental problem of the Japanese market is the management of the 
transmission congestion. Interconnections among utilities are limited in capacity; for this 
reason it may happen that the all the transactions among players cannot be accommodated. 
Algorithms, to decide who should have the right to use transmission capacity and how the 
transmission capacity limitation should influence the electricity price, are developed and 
tested. The basic concept implemented for the transmission congestion management is the 
market splitting model. 
This thesis is organized as follow. 
 
In the second chapter of the dissertation, the market rules are analyzed. Since, the 
particularity of electricity as commodity is the impossibility of storage and the need to be 
consumed in the same instant of production, the importance of sequential markets (from 
forward market to real time market) and the link between them is analyzed in the chapter. 
Furthermore, the delivery of electricity is subject to several other services that can be 
compared to the logistics for other goods. These services are commonly known as ancillary 
services. Since the market volume related to ancillary services is an important part of the 
total electricity market (it may vary between 5 to 15% of the total market volume), the 
ancillary service market and the rules associated with them are also analyzed. 
 
In the third chapter, the market from the viewpoint of players in general and of generation 
companies in particular is analyzed and methods to improve the market price forecasting 
and optimize the bid strategy are explained. The market price forecasting is a fundamental 
task for market participants. A player with a good knowledge of the possible market price 
for the following day is able to develop an optimal bid that will increase the daily profit. As 
a consequence of the high volatility of the market price, it is important to employ a flexible 
method to be able to catch all the elements that influence the price. A neural network 
algorithm is implemented and tested on the Japan Electric Power Exchange data proving 
the performance. Since, short-term generation planning objective function change from a 
cost minimization to a revenue maximization problem under deregulation, a method to 
approach the new unit commitment problem is developed. Several operational constraints 
such as ramp-rate, minimum time-up and time-down, transmission limits, are considered 
with the intent to find an operational schedule and a market bid that are at the same time 
profitable and operationally feasible. To solve the complex unit commitment problem, i.e. a 
mixed-integer non-linear problem, an optimization method is developed. The method is a 
combination of quadratic and dynamic programming integrated together to produce an 
optimal operational schedule. Furthermore, techniques to individuate possible speculation 
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between electricity and ancillary services markets are developed.  
 
The fourth chapter describes an optimal portfolio approach for PPS. In Japan, differently 
from the utility companies, PPS may supply electricity to customers disperse in several 
control areas. The supply source can be dislocated in any region and the PPS have to apply 
for a special wheeling contract (furikae) to send electricity across control areas. Losses, 
contract constraints and wheeling fees have to be evaluated together to develop the optimal 
schedule that maximizes PPS profit. This thesis proposes an optimization algorithm for 
multi-area scheduling. The algorithm is a modification of the unit commitment approach 
proposed for strategic bid development. 
 
In the fifth chapter, one of the main problems related to the deregulated market, the 
transmission congestion problem is presented and solution methods proposed.  
The transmission congestion problem is caused by the conflict of interests among the 
market players: limited transmission resources have to be allocated to several independent 
players, all of them operating with the intent to improve their own profit. Since it is not 
possible to improve the transmission capacity in a short time frame and in several cases the 
economical benefit of new transmission line does not justify the investment costs, methods 
that allocate in a fair and efficient way the available capacity and allowed the participants to 
understand the congestion are fundamental for a good market behavior. This dissertation 
defines a framework to identify the congested paths and methodologies to relive congestion 
based on the market split approach. The market prices produced by the method are clear 
signal to market participants to identify congested areas and new business opportunity. In 
particular areas that are strongly congested have a high price due to the import electricity, 
on the contrary, areas that are not congested or that have excess of electricity see a low 
price. The framework is implemented with the intent to support both the forward and the 
spot electricity markets. The forward market is normally managed with a continuous 
auction mechanism. Transmission constraints are integrated in the auction algorithm, and 
the market price, for each area, changes according to the constraints. For the spot market, a 
single price auction approach is proposed. An iterative algorithm to individuate the possible 
congested transmission line and to find the submarkets in which it is necessary to split the 
market to relief congestion is developed. The proposed methods to manage and relief 
congestion are simple, based on an algebraic algorithm that ensures reproducibility and 
always-feasible solution. Complex radial and loop network can be modeled and solved. An 
algorithm to solve complex network constraints such as band or minimum flow constraints 
(particularly important in the Japanese transmission network where DC interconnection are 
in operation) is also developed and applied to the spot market congestion management.  
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The sixth chapter summarizes the contents of the dissertations and strengths on the practical 
importance of the new approaches developed during the research periods. In this chapter 
the open problems and research theme that still need to be investigated are also introduced 
with the intent to propose future improvement of the deregulated electricity market. 
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Chapter 2 Analysis of Market Rules 
 
Before to develop the bidding strategies and the transmission management, this thesis 
wants to explain the kind of markets and the rules already implemented around the world. A 
clear understanding of the markets rules is indispensable for the market participants in order 
to develop of a consistent bid strategy. The market rules include: the market structured, the 
participants constraints, the clearing rules, and the transmission network access rules. 
The market structure can be classified in three main types: 
• the central market model 
• the decentralized model 
• the hybrid model 
In addition to the main market structures, it is necessary to look at which kind of products 
can be exchanged in the market and how the transactions are processed. 
Auction mechanisms and congestion management methodologies are also classified in this 
chapter.  
 
2.1  Market structures 
 
In a central market, a single market operator purchases all the electricity and the related 
products. Generators cannot select freely the counter-party, and they are forced to sell 
trough an auction mechanism to the central market. Examples of this kind of market 
structure are the Korean market model or the English market until 2001. The central market, 
also known as compulsory market, has the advantage to concentrate the operating power in 
the hand of the market/transmission operator; in this way it is possible to avoid problems of 
coordination. Nevertheless, the high level of “regulation” do not permit to the market to 
grow properly, this may cause negative effect to the customers. In the English example, it 
was possible recognized events of market power, gaming and unfair market pricing. 
In a decentralized or bilateral model all the electricity is sold through bilateral contracts. 
This kind of model gives to the generator companies a high level of freedom but it can 
create coordination problems among the players in the market. Examples of this kind of 
market are the NETA model (UK) and the Japanese market. Several power exchanges or 
brokerage services can be implemented also in this market structure but they are not 
mandatory and in general, they do not have any responsibility in the power delivery. 
In the hybrid model a generator is free to sell electricity to a counter party on a bilateral 
base, but it may also decide to sell through a market operator that coordinate the transaction 
and ensure more stability and less risk. 
In some cases, generators and retailers can stipulate bilateral transaction until several hours 
before the delivery, after this term they are forced to sell in the market as it happens in PJM 
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(Pennsylvania, new Jersey, Maryland). 
The company that operates the market can operate the transmission system (for example on 
PJM) or the transmission system can be operated independently from the market (the 
previous California model, the Nord Pool). 
Figure 3 schematizes the market models developed in the world until now. ISO is the 
acronyms of independent system operator, SC schedule coordinator (there are several other 
definitions such as balance group or balancing entity, the Japanese PPS can be recognized 
as a kind of SC) and PX power exchange. 
 
Figure 3: Market structures 
 
Another way to classify the market structure is based on the rules adopted for the 
transmission access. A bilateral model is also defined as third party access model because 
companies that are not utilities access to the transmission network. 
 
2.2 Products related with electricity and time schedule 
 
Electricity is a complex commodity. The main difference between electricity and other 
commodities is that electricity cannot be stored but it has to be used at the same time that it 
is produced. For this reason it becomes difficult to create a market. From a theoretical point 
of view it is necessary to have a real time market in which the electricity is priced at the 
time it is produced and consumed. Since it is impossible to operate a market second by 
second, the common approach is to create products in the futures and adjust the exchanged 
quantity sequentially based on the changes in the consumption forecast.  
It is possible to distinguish two main categories of products: energy products (the unit is 
kWh) and products related with the capacity (the unit is kW). The energy products are the 
main part of the market; products related with capacity may be seen as the essential 
additional services indispensable to deliver electricity that are not the electricity itself. In 
Figure 4 the time frame and the relation between products is represented. 
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Figure 4: Electricity related products and time schedule 
 
2.2.1 Energy products 
The energy products are generally classified based on the time differences between the 
transaction time and the delivery time. Future and forward are products in the late future. 
The common time frame is between 3 years to a week ahead to the delivery time. Future 
and forward are contracts in the future for the delivery of a certain quantity of electricity at 
a predetermined price. The difference between future and forward is in the type of contract. 
Futures are contracts exchanged only in an official exchange, they are in general 
anonymous (the buyer does not know the name of the seller) and can be delivered or settled 
only financially based on the spot price. Forwards are bilateral contracts between a buyer 
and a seller, the seller has obligation to deliver it. In Japan a forward market was created in 
2005 and it is still in operation. In the spot market, players trade electricity for the near 
future (normally between 24 hours to 1 hour ahead). The price is set for each hour or part of 
it. In the Japanese spot market 30 minutes products for the next day are traded. Either if the 
electricity traded in the spot market will be delivered just few hours after the stipulation of 
the contract, in the real time, it may still happen that several conditions change, and, as 
consequence, the market position of the players. An unexpected high temperature may 
cause an increase of demand and, as consequence, the market position of retails company 
may become short (the purchase electricity is not enough to cover the demand), a generator 
can fail to produce electricity, or a sudden increase of wind can be the cause of an 
unexpected power production by wind generation. To adjust the changes in demand and 
generation and to keep the energy balance, a real time market or a balance mechanism is 
introduced. In general, the real time market is run few minutes before the delivery time by 
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the power system operator (10-20 minutes).  
After the delivery of the electricity, it is necessary to measure the real production and 
consumption of each player and to settle the imbalance to avoid subsidization or unfair 
operations.  
In the Japanese schema the real time market is not yet implemented. Eventual imbalance 
produced by PPS are absorbed by the utilities and charged at a fix rate. 
 
2.2.2  Other electricity related products 
To ensure the deliver of electricity other related products are indispensable.  
One important parameter in power system is the available capacity. The available capacity 
is defined as the quantity of power (kW) that can be on line at in certain day. Power plant 
maintenance or lack of power plant can be the causes of shortage of available capacity. To 
avoid this situation, North America organizations such as PJM (Pennsylvania, New Jersey 
Maryland regional transmission organization) and New York ISO introduced a capacity 
market. The objective is to incentive the construction of new power plant in case of lack of 
capacity, and to indirectly guide the maintenance schedule of power plants in period of low 
demand. The capacity market is run on a long-term base, from 6 month to one year ahead 
the delivery day. 
In addition of the products described until now, just few words about transmission rights. 
An owner of a transmission right has the possibility to send electricity between two areas 
without warring about congestions. At the starting, the transmission owners are in 
possession of the transmission rights. They sell it on an auction based to transmission users. 
PJM, New York ISO and other North American organizations implemented a transmission 
right market. In Europe a similar mechanism is utilize to allocate the transmission capacity 
among countries. 
 
2.2.3  Ancillary services 
A special mention about ancillary services shell be done. Ancillary services definition is 
still not standardized among countries. In general an ancillary service is defined as a service 
that is indispensable to deliver the electricity in a safety and stable manner but is not the 
energy itself. Ancillary services include planning, transmission operation, reserve, 
regulation, frequency control, black start, voltage control and reactive power.  
In a vertical integrated power industry, ancillary services were naturally performed by the 
power company and the associated costs were included in the electricity tariff. With the 
deregulation, the transmission operator does not own any generator and for this reason he 
has to procure ancillary services on a competitive base.  
The problem related with ancillary services is fundamental since it affects the generation 
companies’ profit directly. There is no incentive for a generation to produce reactive power 
or to reduce the output to keep a certain margin of system reserve if these services are not 
properly rewarded. 
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In USA, FERC recognized six ancillary services: scheduling, system control and dispatch; 
reactive power supply and voltage control; regulation and frequency response; energy 
imbalance; spinning reserve; supplemental reserve. 
The European transmission operators association (UCTE) recognized three man ancillary 
services: primary control, secondary control, minutes reserve. The primary control is 
defined as power that can be activated in less than 15 seconds; secondary control has to be 
activated in less than 5 minutes, minutes reserve in less than 15 minutes. Each European 
member country is required to supply an amount of reserve proportionally to the peak 
demand. 
Figure 5 shows the reserve quantity and the time-scale utilization in France. 
 
Figure 5: Reserve definition in France 
 
The transmission operator has the responsibility to calculate and to procure the quantity of 
ancillary services necessary to ensure safe power system operation. 
The way to procure ancillary services is different depending on countries. In PJM 
regulation and reserve are acquired by the ISO from the power plants daily. Generators 
submit bids and the PJM selects the bids with an auction mechanism.  
In Germany primary and secondary reserve are auctioned twice a year. A generator, that 
wins the auction, is committed to supply the service for six month.  
France adopted a negotiation schema: the French power system operator purchases primary 
and secondary reserve from selected generators at fix price with a yearly contract. 
 
2.3  Auction and clearing mechanisms 
 
Auction is recognized as the most efficient mechanism to price electricity and to decide the 
transaction among players. Auction has a long history; it has been used from the past in 
several markets or to price goods that the value cannot be easily estimated such as paint or 
large proprieties.  
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Electricity can be classified as a multi-unit good since it is produced by several power 
plants and used by several customers at the same time. 
Figure 6: Auction Mechanism Classification 
 
Figure 6 is a classification of the possible auction mechanisms for electricity. 
First of all the auction mechanisms can be classified based on the timing. In a simultaneous 
auction, all the players are asked to bid before a prefix time (the gate close) and the bids are 
kept secret. The auction operator clears the market in a single calculation and informs the 
participants of the results (accepted quantity and transaction price). Simultaneous auction is 
adopted for day-ahead market because it is fast and does not require iterations. 
In the sequential or continues auction players are informed of the current available bids 
(quantities and prices), players can decide to submit a bid themselves or wait until the price 
changes. Sequential auctions are implemented for commodities or stock. In the electricity 
market sequential or continues auctions are utilized in forward markets. 
Auctions can be classified based on the price setting rules. Two kind of pricing can be 
recognized: the uniform pricing and the discriminatory. 
In the uniform pricing all the participants of the auction see the same price. In general for 
power generation bidding the highest accepted bid set the price. This method is adopted by 
several power exchanges including EEX in German and Nord Pool. 
In a discriminatory auction (also called pay as bid auction), the accepted bids are settled at 
the bid price. The disadvantage of the discriminatory auction is that it dose not produce a 
clear market price. The UK market NETA adopted a pay as bid auction. 
In Figure 7 the concept of uniform price and discriminatory auction for electricity market is 
described. In the example three independent generation companies bid a certain amount of 
power in the market. The demand is represented by the vertical line. The cross between the 
demand and the bids aggregation curve determines the winner of the auction. 
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Figure 7: Uniform Price and Discriminatory Auction for power 
 
The third type of classification regards the players in the market. If both the selling side and 
the buying side are allowed to bid, the auction is defined bilateral auction. In the case in 
which only the generation side bids and a single buyer that set only the quantity needed in 
the market buys the electricity, the auction is called unilateral. In case of market 
concentration (it is common that the generation sector is owned by few strong companies), 
it is recognized that bilateral auction is an effective instrument to control the market price 
and to avoid price spike; nevertheless it is complex to develop a demand side bidding 
process due to the importance of the electricity in the daily life and the consequent 
inelasticity of the demand. 
 
2.4  Congestion management 
 
Another important aspect of electricity as commodity is that electricity has to be delivered 
using the transmission network that is subject to the Maxwell laws. Since the transmission 
network has not an infinite capacity it may happen that is necessary to select expensive bid 
to avoid transmission overloading. The problem of possible transmission overloading in a 
deregulated market is approached with the congestion management.  
In the past, the vertical integrated utility managed the transmission constraints with an 
optimal power flow approach: all the information about generation costs, constraints and 
transmission limits were evaluated at the same time to find the cheapest generation dispatch. 
With the unbundling of the electricity company and the increase of the entities that access 
the transmission network it is indispensable to develop a clear and efficient mechanism that 
ensure the respect of the transmission limits and, at the same time, a fair access at the 
transmission services. 
 
2.4.1  Nodal pricing 
The most famous congestion management technique is the nodal pricing. This method is 
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adopted by several North America markets include New York ISO and PJM. The nodal 
pricing is an optimal power flow based calculation that produces as results the accepted bid 
quantity for each generator and the market price at each network node. In general, a 
marginal incremental approach is adopted to calculate the nodal price. At first the power 
flow calculation is performed and the total generation costs calculated. Next, a unit of 
demand (in general 1 MW) is added to one node and the OPF calculation performed again. 
The cost difference between the two solutions is the nodal price of the node itself. 
Figure 8 is a simple example of a system with 3 nodes. In node A there is a cheap generator 
(30$/MWh), in node B an expensive one (45$/MWh), and, in node C, a demand. For 
simplicity, the impedance of the lines is considered to be the same for each line. The 
transmission line between node A and B is constrained at 100 MW. From the OPF 
calculation, due to the constrain on line A-B, it happens that the price in node C go up to 
60$/MWh 
From the example is evident that the nodal price can be higher than the most expensive bid 
(in same case it may happen that the nodal price in some nodes is lower than the cheapest 
bid).  
The nodal price is an efficient and fair congestion management technique, nevertheless it 
presents some disadvantage: it requires the calculation of several optimal power flow 
iterations. If the system is very large (thousands of nodes) it can take long time before to 
get the solution. In addition it is not so transparent: players can have difficulties to 
understand the price and to develop their bids. In PJM, it was demonstrated that some 
companies could take advantage of the method creating intentional congestion and 
increasing the price in some nodes.  
The method is very effective in a mesh network where it is difficult to individuate the 
influence of the generation output on each transmission line. 
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Figure 8: Nodal price calculation 
 
2.4.2  Zonal price 
The zonal price is an approach similar to the nodal price but with the introduction of several 
approximations. To avoid complex calculation and to produce a clear market price signal 
the total network is divided in few areas (in general from three to ten). The main objective 
is to ensure that the market participants clearly understand the congestion areas and, as 
consequence, invests in new generation properly. The disadvantage of the zonal price is that 
eventually intra-area congestions have to relief with other methods to ensure proper 
transmission network operation. The method was adopted in California and Texas. 
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2.4.3  Market split 
Particularly important for this thesis is the market split method. In chapter 5, a new 
methodology for solving a congested market with a market split method is introduced. The 
market split is useful in situation were the market is involving more than one control area. 
It is evident that the interconnections among control areas are in general week. The cause of 
this is that they were constructed not for market propose but with the intent to support 
frequency control and power system operation among control centers. For this reason it is 
common to have congestion problem among control areas, the market split method divides 
the control areas in submarket in case of congestion.  
The market split mechanism was first introduced in Nord Pool in 1995. Nord Pool is a 
market that involves four countries (Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark). Each country 
is a control area. Following the Nord Pool example, Germany, which has a network 
composed by four control areas, adopted the same model. Japan decided to adopt the 
market split mechanism in the spot market to manage the transmission congestion among 
power utilities. 
The market split concept is very simple: at first an auction between buyers and sellers is 
performed. In this stage the transmission constraints are not considered. Once the market 
solution is available, the transmission constraints are checked. If there is an overload on 
some interconnections the market is divided in two submarkets and the market solution for 
each of them recalculated. The results consist in different prices for each submarket. 
In the recent years, the European countries are adopting the concept of market-coupling. It 
is a methodology that allowed optimizing the utilization of the interconnection line among 
countries. The market-coupling concept is the opposite of the market split. Starting from 2 
or more independent markets, a certain amount of electricity is exchanged among markets. 
France, Belgium and Holland had start a market coupling mechanism in 2006.  
 
2.4.4 Counter flow re-dispatch 
To manage the possible local congestions that may occur inside areas due to the 
approximation introduced by the zonal pricing or market split, several countries adopted a 
counter flow re-dispatching approach. On the real time the transmission system operator 
may ask to two or more generating units to modified the output in order to produce a 
counter flow that may relief the overloading of one or more lines. The system operator 
refunds the generators of the costs that may incur as consequence of the re-dispatch. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
An analysis of the market structures, rules and congestion management was described in 
this chapter.  
This thesis considers a bilateral model with an independent power exchange.  
Transmission access is possible for generation companies and schedule coordinators on a 
contract base and under the payment of the appropriated fees. Schedule coordinators (PPS) 
submit the wheeling schedule to the transmission operator daily to ensure safe and efficient 
operation of the power system. 
The power exchange is a voluntary exchange that operates spot and forward market. The 
spot market is operated with a simultaneous, uniform pricing, bilateral auction model 
(single price auction), market players are allowed to submit multiple bids including buying 
and selling orders; the forward market implements a sequential continuous bilateral model 
(zaraba) in which the price change continuously depending of the market players behavior. 
The transmission congestion is managed with a market split approach that ensures an 
optimal utilization of the available capacity and a clear congestion signal to the market 
participants. 
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Chapter 3 Strategic bidding for generation companies 
 
Generation companies compete in the wholesale market to supply electricity at the best 
price. The objective of these companies is to run the business in the most profitable way. To 
support the generation companies in the bidding task, this thesis developed a strategic 
bidding formulation. A strategic biding is based on two main factors. The first is a good 
knowledge on the market situation; a clear understating of the market and a precise price 
forecast are the keys. This thesis propose a neural network based price forecasting method 
that do not include only the historical price data but utilize also the forecast demand to 
determine the price in the future. 
The second factor is a good knowledge of the generation costs and the possibility to 
minimize them. This thesis proposed an optimization method that, considering the 
forecasted market price and the operational cost, produces the optimal strategic bid for the 
day-ahead market. 
The profit function for the generation company can be expressed as the difference of the 
revenue and the costs. 
 
,where  
t = time interval 
Pt= market price is a function of the market rules and the players bids 
C(Qt) = generation cost is a function of generating unit characteristics and the fuel price 
Qt = production quantity is a function of the bid price, bid quantity and market conditions.  
 
In the following section each term of the equation will be formalized to develop the 
objective function, which has be solved to calculate the optimal bid. 
A bid is defined as the series of price/quantity couples that a player submits to the market; it 
can be composed by either will to sell and will to buy electricity. In this dissertation it is 
assumed that a sell bid is represented by a positive quantity, on the other side, a buy bid is 
represented by a negative quantity. In several market, including Japan, each player can 
develop a multiple bid for each product, the quantity that is win is a function of the bid 
price and the market price. One common condition is that the bid quantity have to increase 
with the increasing of the price. 
∑∑ −⋅=
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Figure 9: Example of multiple block bid 
Figure 9 is and example of a multiple block bid. The player expresses the will to buy 100 
MW if the price is lower than 10 yen/kWh, 50 MW if the price is between 10 and 11 
yen/kWh; if the market price is between 12 yen/kWh and 13 yen/kWh, the player wish to 
sell 80MW and for price higher than 13yen/kWh the selling quantity become 150MW. 
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3.1 Price forecasting 
 
Electricity price is an essential economic factor, which has a large impact on industry and 
consumers. Electric industry has been deregulated and restructured worldwide for reducing 
electricity prices. Trading in electricity market has the advantage to sell electricity at a high 
price. On the other hands, it may happen to incur in the risk of low electricity price when 
demand is low. Therefore, high accuracy forecasting methods are required for decreasing 
the risk and developing an optimal strategic bid. 
In the proposed method, firstly, neural networks are applied to forecast total maximum 
power demand for the next day of the mainland in Japan. Secondly, electricity price at peak 
time on the next day is predicted based on the previously forecasted demand. Because of 
the strong correlation of power demands and electricity prices, it was possible to improve 
the accuracy of electricity price prediction. 
 
3.1.1 Price analysis 
Power demand is one of the factors that strongly influence the electricity price. For this 
reason, to perform a correct price forecasting it is indispensable to have very high quality 
demand forecasting. 
The electric power supply system is indispensable for lifeline systems and industrial 
activities. However, electric power is not storable, so it is necessary for system operators to 
keep adequacy of electric power against continuously varying power demands, and at the 
same time, it is necessary to forecast daily power demands accurately for stable and 
efficient power system operations. 
Forecasting of power demands is classified into to categories; one is the long term 
forecasting and the other is the short term that may vary from a week, to few hours 
depending on the purpose and the targeted period of prediction. In this thesis, I focus on the 
prediction of demand for the next day, because these data mainly determined the bid in the 
day-ahead market. Figure 10 shows changes of the electricity price in the spot market and 
the peak electric demands from April 2005 to March 2006 in Japan. The large fluctuations 
are seasonal changes, it may be recognized that electric demands in summer and winter are 
very large. Compared with them, electric demands in spring and autumn are relatively small. 
The small fluctuations are weekly changes. The electric demands on weekdays are larger 
than those on weekends and holidays. It can be said that the electric power demand is 
influenced by various kinds of nonlinear data such as wheatear related variables. Moreover, 
electric power price is also influenced by various kinds of nonlinear data such as the type of 
power supply and the price of the fuel, and so on. Therefore, for predicting electricity price, 
I applied neural networks that hold high performances to extract dynamic features, to learn 
unstudied data and to represent nonlinear correlations. 
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Figure 10: JEPX spot price and Japanese peak demand trend 
Since it is important to select the input variables for forecasting electricity spot price, the 
correlation between the electricity price and various nonlinear data is analyzed. Figure 11 
shows the correlation between electricity price and nonlinear data including, temperature, 
demand and market price in the previous day from October 2005 to March 2006. 
Correlation coefficients are in the range from -1 to +1. Here, +1 is a direct correlation: an 
increase of the variable implicates an increase of the market price, and -1 represents an 
inverse correlation: an increase of a certain variable has as consequence a decrease of the 
spot price. In addition, 0 means that changes in demand or other parameters do not 
influence the price. Analysis of the historical data shows that there is strong correlation 
between electric power price and power demand of both the day-ahead and the same day 
(Figure 11). 
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Figure 11: The correlation between electricity price and nonlinear data 
 
Coefficients of the correlation show that electricity price has the time series characteristic. 
From this analysis, it has shown that the peak electricity price has three characteristics; 
• Electricity price is influenced by the power demand. 
• Electricity price has the time series characteristic. 
• Features of electricity price differ on weekdays, weekend and holidays. 
Moreover, it can be said that the correlation of the power demand of the same day is 
stronger than the power demand of a day ahead, and to utilize the power demand of the 
same day the spot price can be forecasted with more accuracy. Therefore, this proposed 
method forecasts the peak power demand of the day firstly, and secondly the electricity 
price is forecasted by using the forecasted peak power demand and the electricity price of a 
day ahead. 
 
3.1.2 The neural network model 
The multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural network is applied to determine parameters for an 
autoregressive (AR) model considering n discrete time periods as below.  
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where y(k) is a time series datum observed. 
 
A three layer MLP neural network, as shown in Figure 12, is introduced to obtain the AR 
model. All activation functions in hidden layer are tanh(x) (described as fj in Figure 12 ), 
and the activation function in the output layer is ))()((
1
00 ∑
=
+=Σ
hn
j
wxFx . 
Figure 12: A fully connected three-layer feedforward network 
 
The output of the MLP is 
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where 
( ) ( 1), 1,2, ,l y k l l nϕ = − + = K  
wjl :  weight which connects input and hidden layer 
wj  :  weight which connects output and hidden layer 
nh  :  number of hidden neurons 
wj0 :  weight which connects hidden layer and bias 
w0  :  weight which connects output layer and bias 
W
0  : vector form of jw , 1 2[ , , , ]hnw w wK  
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The derivative of the output with respect to the input lϕ  is 
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Now, to make the model much simpler, linear activation function for fj and Fo is applied to 
the MLP in Figure 12, and the linear output can be represented as follows: 
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and the derivative of the output with respect to the input ( )lϕ is 
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From Taylor series expansion, parameter a1 is obtained by 
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In general, the parameters of the AR model can be obtained as follows: 
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From the above equations, the vector of the most likely demand (crisp value) can be 
obtained. 
For the linear activation function in the neural network the inputs are scaled between 0.1 
and 0.9 by the maximum and minimum inputs of the time window considered as below 
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max [ ( 1)]
l
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and 
1,2, ,l n= K  
 
Because the time window for the training moves step by step, ymax and ymin are subsequently 
updated for a correct scaling. Outside of this window there is no need of assuming normal 
distribution of errors, which can give rise to the difficulty of stationary in regular 
regression-based time series modeling. This scaling is also consistent with the fuzzy model 
introduced below which observes the possible data ranges within an interval determined by 
the past data. 
 
3.1.3  The demand forecast model 
A three-layer neural network has been used to forecast the power demand; the number of 
input neurons is three and that of output neurons is one. As input variables, the maximum 
temperature, the average DI (discomfort index), and the day-ahead peak electric demand 
are selected out of the factors of the correlation analysis. The previous month demand data 
are used for the learning process of the three-layer neural networks to forecast the peak 
demands of the next month. Figure 13 shows the neural network model for the proposed 
forecasting. 
In this thesis, it is necessary to integrate each input variable of the nine Japanese regions 
into the national input variables. The national power demand is the sum of the peak 
demands in each region; and a weighted sum of the other input variables at each region is 
used as an input datum to neural networks. The weight coefficients are determined by 
demand ratios in different regions.  
  
Dnational = D1+ D2+…+ D9     
Dnational: Forecasted total peak demand of whole mainland. 
D1= demand in Hokkaido region 
D2= demand in Tohoku region 
: 
Dn= demand in Kyushu region 
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Dn    : Peak demand at each region. 
Tave  : Average weather factor at for the entire country. 
Tn    :  Weather factor at each region. 
wn    : Wight of various places in demand. 
 
Figure 13: Neural network model for demand forecasting 
 
3.1.4  Numerical application 
The proposed approach was applied to a set of real data covering the winter period from 
January to March 2006. Since the first week of January is a peculiar week because of a 
long-term holiday, this period is removed from applied data. To prove the influence of the 
peak demand on the spot price I forecast the price in 3 different cases and the results are 
compared with the real market prices published by JEPX. In the first case the peak demand 
data is ignored and the forecasted price is calculated using only the previous days prices. 
In the second case in addition to the previous days prices, I introduced the forecasted peak 
demand as input. 
In the third case, the electricity price is forecasted from the real power demand. Either if, 
for practical forecasting propose it is not possible to know in advance the real power 
demand of the next day, this case was introduced with the intent to confirm the assumption 
of correlation between price and peak demand. 
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Figure 14: Result of next day maximum demand forecast from January to March 2006 
 
Figure 14 shows the result of forecasting peak power demand of the next day. It is evident 
that the neural network performs accurately in the prediction of the demand fluctuation. 
Figure 15 shows the result of the forecasted electricity prices at peak time.  
Table 1 shows the comparison of the average error ratio of each case. From Figure 15 and 
Table 1, it can be understood that case3 has the highest accuracy. It can be said that the 
correlation between price and demand is very high and reproducible trough neural network. 
From Figure 15 it may be said that it is still difficult to predict spike in prices using neural 
network. It is evident that the error is larger in January, period in which the Japanese Power 
Exchange experienced several price spikes. 
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Figure 15: Result of next day electricity price forecast from January to March 2006 
As a result, it has been shown that the amount of the electricity demands is closely related 
to the electricity price and moreover that the proposed method can follow the price 
fluctuation which changes on Saturday and Sunday and Monday when the volatility of 
price from a day ahead is large. 
By those applications, it is verified that the method is able to cope with the large price 
fluctuation in such as in the electric power exchange in Japan. 
Since the number of transaction is still small and the price is not stable in the Japanese 
electric power exchange that have just started to operate from April, 2005, it is expected 
that more accurate forecast of the system becomes possible when the amount of the electric 
power dealings will increase in the future and the electric power price will become stable. 
Table 1: Comparison of average error of each case 
Average error [%] Case 1 Case2 Case3 
January 11.20 9.65 8.81 
February 6.39 6.17 6.03 
March 9.02 8.80 8.74 
Total average 8.74 8.10 7.87 
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3.2  Generation bidding development 
 
The strategic bidding is the most important task of a company who owns power plants. The 
bid has to be decided based on the market price, the power plants constraints and the costs. 
In a vertical integrated utility generators were dispatched with the objective to supply the 
total load at the minimum costs. The tools to calculate the optimal operation point for each 
generator are the unit commitment and the economic load dispatch. For generation 
companies the same tools can be utilized but the objective function changes. In this thesis, 
two strategic bid methods are developed: the cost base and the price base bid. 
 
3.2.1 Generation costs determination 
To formulate a consistent bid in case of an auction or an offer in case of counter party, it is 
fundamental to understand clearly the costs of a generator. In this section a model to 
determine the generation cost is described.  
The generation costs can be divided in 3 groups: 
- Investments costs 
- Operation and Maintenance costs 
- Fuel costs 
The investment costs include the capital that has to be invested for buying and constructing 
the generation unit. Several studies, available in literature, report about the average 
investments costs for kind of fuel or dimension of the generating units. Investments have to 
be deeply understood and analyzed in the decision process of constructing a new power 
plant but are not fundamental in the daily bidding process. 
These kinds of costs do not influence directly the daily bid strategy, and for this reason are 
not analyze more in deep. 
Operation and maintenance costs may be divided in fixed O&M costs that have to be 
analyzed and evaluated in the long term planning (yearly based) and variable O&M that 
influence the total cost in the short term planning and may be evaluated also during the 
bidding process. O&M are also not considered since I will focus on the short term bidding 
problem. 
The fuel costs are a function of the operation level. Generally, the fuel consumption for 
hour is modeled as a quadratic function of the power output level of the generating unit. In 
formula: 
cpbpapC +⋅+⋅= 2)(  
,where 
C is the consumption function (MJ/h), p is the generation output level, a is the quadratic 
term (MJ/kW²h), b is the linear term (MJ/kWh) and c is the fix term (MJ/h) also known as 
no load consumption. 
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In a graph the function looks like Figure 16 
 
Figure 16: Fuel cost function 
 
The marginal consumption is defined as the increment of consumption of fuel for an 
increment of power in output in formula: 
bpa
dp
pdC
MC +⋅== 2
)(
 
 
In addition to the hourly consumption function, the start-up consumption is also another 
important element that has to be modeled. The start up fuel consumption can be modeled as 
the inverse of an exponential function of the number of hours that the unit is off before the 
starting time. In formula: 
offtoff e
dtC
1
)(1 −=  
,where 
C1 is the consumption function (MJ), toff is the number of hours from the last shut down 
and d (MJ) is the total consumption of fuel in case of completely cold start-up.  
A graphical representation is plotted in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Start-up cost function 
 
The functions C and C1 have to be multiplied for the price of the utilized fuel to get the 
costs. 
From the described model is evident that, once that the cost parameter are fixed, it is 
possible to calculate the total costs as function of the output p and the number of hours that 
the unit was off in case of start-up. 
 
3.2.2 The unit commitment problem 
Unit commitment is the problem of determining the schedule of generating units subject to 
the equipment and operating constraints. The generation schedule includes the ON/OFF 
decision and the operation target level. Since the ON/OFF is an integer variable and the 
operation target is a continuous variable, the unit commitment is a mixed integer nonlinear 
problem. 
The operating constraints are classified in two groups: 
1) Constraints on the output: 
Operating range (maximum and minimum output of a unit) 
Up and down ramp rate 
Fuel constraints 
2) Time constraints: 
 Minimum time-up 
 Minimum time down 
 Starting time range 
The optimization consists in minimizing the operational costs or maximizing the profit, 
subject to the above-described constraints. 
This thesis approach the problem with an iterative algorithm that treat the constraints on the 
output with a quadratic programming approach and the time constraints with a dynamic 
programming approach. 
toff (h)
C1(Kcal)
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At the first step the unit commitment variable ON/OFF is set equal ON for all the 
calculation time range (24 or 168 hours depending if it is one day or one week unit 
commitment). The quadratic programming is performed to calculate the optimal dispatch 
level subject to the constraints on the output. The optimal output, operational costs and the 
time constraints are then integrated in a dynamic programming problem. Figure 18 is a 
graphical representation of the dynamic programming algorithm for a unit with minimum 
time up equal three hours, minimum time down equal two hours and no constraints on the 
starting time range. 
 
Figure 18: Dynamic Programming 
 
The solution of the dynamic programming is the optimal ON/OFF sequence. The sequence 
is utilized as the base of a new quadratic programming in which the generation dispatch has 
to be adjusted. The process has to be iterated until there is a decrease in the total fuel costs 
or an increase in the profit (the objective function). Figure 19 shows the flow chart of the 
unit algorithm developed in this research. 
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Figure 19: Flow chart of the unit commitment algorithm 
 
3.2.3 Player strategies 
After analyzing the type of players that competes in the market, it was clear that it is 
necessary to distinguish two groups based on the generation portfolio and the market share. 
The first group of generation companies includes small players with a market share of 10% 
or less. These players are not able to influence the market price, for the reason they can be 
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defined as price takers. For a price taker, this thesis proposes a price based bidding strategy; 
the player maximizes his profit under the consideration that his bid will not influence the 
price. The main variables include the operation schedule for generators and the quantity 
that the player has to bid in the market. 
A large player, with several generating units and a large market share, has to consider the 
influence of his bid on the market price. It is possible to affirm that players with a share of 
20 or 30% are able to change the price due to the market power that they have. This thesis 
defines these players as price makers. For a price maker I propose a cost base bidding. The 
objective is the minimization of the total cost to produce a certain quantity of electricity that 
can be bid in the market. The bidding price has to be developed based on the actual costs 
and of the reasonable profit that the company intends to produce. 
 
3.2.4 Price based bidding 
Small players with only little generation capacity are not able to influence the market price. 
Those players are known as price takers. For price taker players, this thesis proposes a price 
bidding strategy.  
The price base bid is build by a unit commitment approach. The objective function of the 
optimization problem is the maximization of the profit: 
( )( )( )∑ ∑ 





−⋅+⋅−⋅ −
t i
titiititiitt
Up
UUCUpCQP
tit
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,
,0min1)(max
,
 
where 
Pt : forecasted price for time t 
Qt: bid quantity for time t 
pt: generator unit i output at time t 
Ci: generator i cost function 
C1i: generator i start-up cost function 
Ui,t: generator i schedule status at time t (U=1 generator ON, U=0 generator OFF) 
 
The first term of the equation is the revenue from selling in the spot market (it is the 
payment in case of buying from the market: negative Qt); the second term is the summation 
of the fuel cost for each unit including the start-up cost. 
 
The objective function is subject to several constraints: 
1) Energy balance constrain 
tDQp tt
i
ti ∀+=∑ ,  
where 
Dt : eventual demand or supply obligation at time t 
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2) Operation constraints 
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where 
Qi: minimum output of unit i 
Qi: maximum output of unit i 
rampupi  output increasing ramp rate of unit i 
rampdni  output decreasing ramp rate of unit I 
 
3) Time constraints 
Time constraints 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) tUUTX
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where 
Xi,t
on : on status of unit i 
X,ti
off : off status of unit i 
Ti
minup: minimum time up of unit i 
Ti
mindn: minimum time down of unit i 
 
The optimization problem is solved with the decommissioning method described in 3.2.3. 
Once the output level is calculated for each generating unit, the bid quantity for each time 
interval Qt is computed from the energy balance equation.  
Figure 20 is an example of calculation for a generation company with 8 small units and a 
supply obligation (the blue line over the 24 hours). The red line is the forecasted market 
price plot. The difference between the supply obligation and the sum of the generation 
output represent the optimal bid quantity Qt. A negative Qt means a buy order; a positive Qt 
is a sell order. The price associated with the bid quantity is the forecasted price. 
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Figure 20: Generation schedule 
 
The Japanese power exchange allows each player to make a multiple bid. A multiple bid is 
a combination of several price-quantity couples. The only condition in a multiple-bid is that 
it has to be crescent (the bid quantity increase with the price). 
The possibility to make a multiple bid can be used to hedge the risk associated with errors 
in the price forecasting. It was shown in the previous section, that either in case of a good 
quality forecasting an average error of 8-9% is still present. 
The multiple-bid is created generating several price scenarios. I propose to create each price 
curve from the original forecasted spot price introducing a percentage variation as 
described in Figure 21.  
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Figure 21: Price scenarios 
The proposed optimization method is then applied for each price scenario creating a 
generating units dispatch for each price condition. The optimal bid curve for the generation 
company is composed by prices for each scenario and the associated bid quantity. Figure 22 
is an example of multiple blocks bid for one time period. 
It may be possible that for two different prices, the algorithm produces the same optimal 
bid quantity. In this case, the multiple-bid has to be reduced to create a monotonically 
increasing bid.   
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Figure 22: Multiple blocks bid 
 
3.2.5 Cost based bidding 
A market player prefers to adopt a cost base bid strategy if the bid of the player can 
influence the market price. This kind of player is known as price maker.  
To develop a cost base bidding the total selling quantity has to be given and the bid price is 
calculated from the generation cost in each time period.  
The objective function changes from profit maximization to cost minimization. In formula: 
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where the symbols have the same meaning of the previous section. 
In this case the quantity to bid Qt is given for each bid interval. 
The objective function is subject to the energy balance constrain and the operational 
constraints for each generating unit as described in 3.2.4. 
The optimization problem is solved with the same method utilize for the price based bid 
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approach.  
Once the target output for each unit is determinate, it is necessary to calculate the bid price. 
Generation companies have two alternatives: set the bid price as the marginal cost of the 
most expensive unit committed in the time interval, or utilize the average cost of all the unit 
committed in the interval. From a theoretical point of view the marginal cost is the most 
correct bid price but some companies prefer to add fix costs and calculate the bid price as 
average of the operational costs. 
To create a multiple bid, as previous described, it is necessary to build several scenarios and 
to calculate the costs for each of these. In the cost base bid, the scenarios are determined by 
the quantity of electricity that the player wants to buy or sell in the market.  
Figure 23 is an example of scenarios setting. 
 
Figure 23: Scenarios for cost base bid 
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3.2.6 Multi-product bidding 
In the previous two sections, the optimal bidding strategy for selling electricity in a spot 
market is developed. In the real market, a generator can decide to sell also other product in 
addition of electricity. As described in the second chapter of this thesis, the transmission 
operator may acquire ancillary services such as regulation and reserve from generators with 
an auction base mechanism.  
Even though electricity, regulation and reserve services are transacted in a market, they are 
strongly related among themselves because the generation capacity is utilized to produce 
ancillary services as well as electricity at the same time. Especially the mechanical unit 
characteristics, such as ramp-rate and the mechanical capacity of the unit, have a strong 
effect on these transactions. Figure 24 illustrates the inter-operational relation among the 
previously mentioned commodities. A generator, operating at the maximum level, cannot 
trade neither regulation and reserve services. Further, the shut down unit cannot trade 
regulation and spinning type of reserve. 
 
Figure 24: Capacity utilization 
 
Electricity and ancillary services are paid to each generator at the market clearing prices. 
Based on the market information such as forecasted market clearing prices and transmission 
charge, the generation company calculates the production of each commodity and the 
associated price that each unit has to bid in each market in order to maximize the profit. 
The problem is formulated using a constrained optimization approach. The objective is the 
maximization of the profit for the generating units owned by the company, subject to the 
unit operational constraints such as ramp-rate, minimum time up, minimum time up, and 
mechanical constraints on the production. As in the previous section, it is supposed that the 
generation company is a price taker, the forecasted prices are taken as parameters for the 
problem and the quantities to bid in each market as the variables that have to be calculated. 
The generator may be able to supply electricity and ancillary services in several markets. 
For example a generator can sell in the New York market or in the Ontario market 
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depending on the economical conditions. 
The problem is formulated as below: 
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The following list summarized the symbols in the above formula. 
Pm
e : forecasted price for electricity market m 
Pm
reg: forecasted price for regulation market m 
Pm
res: forecasted price for reserve market m 
Ci: cost function for generator i 
Qim
e: bid quantity in electricity market m by generator i 
Qim
reg: bid quantity in regulation market m by generator i 
Q im
res: bid quantity in reserve market m by generator i 
Ui: status variable for generator i (0=off, 1=on) 
 
, where the first and second term in the equation represent the possible revenue from the 
market and the production costs, respectively. The objective function is subject to the 
following constraints: 
Capacity constraints 
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where 
Qi: minimum output of unit i 
Qi: maximum output of unit i 
Time constraints 
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where 
Xi
on : on status of unit i 
Xi
off : off status of unit i 
Ti
minup: minimum running time of unit i 
Ti
mindn: minimum shutting down time of unit i
 Ramp-rate constraints 
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where Rampi is the ramp rate of unit i. 
Since the problem to be solved is characterized as a mixed integer-continuous one, the unit 
commitment algorithm, described in 3.2.2 that integrates quadratic programming and 
dynamic programming is applied to deal with both the continuous and the integer variables, 
respectively. Firstly, the problem is solved with respect to the continuous variables Qs 
utilizing quadratic programming, and then with respect to the integer variables Us utilizing 
dynamic programming. 
 
In the following example, the quantities that have to be bid in each market and the 
associated prices are determined utilizing the proposing method. In addition, the probable 
profit and revenue are calculated and compare with the case in which the generation 
company will not consider the possibility to bid in several markets utilizing the proposed 
optimal decision making methodology. 
It is supposed that the generation company owns one generating unit and it has the 
possibility to bid in two markets the three products: electricity regulation and reserve. 
The hourly production cost for each unit ($/h) is supposed to be quadratic with the 
production level, in formula: 
( ) ieiieiieii cQbQaQC +⋅+⋅= 2  
For simplicity the fuel cost is already integrated in the cost function. 
The regulation supplying time is set at 3 minutes and the reserve time is set at 10 minutes. 
In Figure 25, the forecasted prices for electricity regulation and reserve are plotted. 
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Figure 25: Prices in the 2 markets 
 
Table 2 contains the cost data and the operational characteristic of each unit. It is supposed 
that the generator has the obligation to sell all the 3 services in the same market during a 
time interval. 
Table 2: Unit characteristics 
 A 
($/MWh²) 
b 
($/MWh) 
c 
($/h) 
Ramp 
(MW/m) 
min time 
up (h) 
min time 
down (h) 
min 
(MW) 
max 
(MW) 
Unit 1 0.005 8.41 503 8 4 4 500 150 
 
From the calculation the follow optimal quantity for each unit for each market for each 
products is calculated and shown in Table 3.  
Table 3: Optimal bid quantity 
Time 1:00 2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 
Qe 0 0 0 0 0 198 261 336 408 408 408 408 
Qreg 0 0 0 0 0 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Qres 0 0 0 0 0 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
m - - - - - 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 
Time 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00 
Qe 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 408 330 270 
Qreg 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Qres 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
m 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 
 
The price that should be bid is the minimum between the forecasted price and the marginal 
cost for energy and any price below the forecasted for ancillary services. In this way the 
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generator will increase the possibility to win the bid reducing the risk to run the unit under 
its production costs. 
The forecasted profit for this bid is: 38949 $ 
On the contrary, Table 4 considers the case in which the generation company optimizes the 
quantity to bid in the market considering only the energy bidding. Once that the electricity 
quantity is set the generator bid the residual capacity in the ancillary service market. For 
this calculation it is also considered that the generation choose to bid in one market only. 
The bid prices are set in the same way of the previous example. 
 
Table 4: Optimal bid quantity without consideration about the multi-market multi product 
possibility 
Time 1:00 2:00 3:00 4:00 5:00 6:00 7:00 8:00 9:00 10:00 11:00 12:00 
Qe 0 0 0 0 0 0 336 306 408 488 500 500 
Qreg 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 24 24 24 0 0 
Qres 0 0 0 0 0 0 80 80 80 0 0 0 
m - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Time 13:00 14:00 15:00 16:00 17:00 18:00 19:00 20:00 21:00 22:00 23:00 24:00 
Qe 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 469 408 483 329 0 
Qreg 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24 24 24 24 0 
Qres 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 29 80 5 80 0 
m 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 
 
The forecasted profit for this bid is: 28471 $ 
It is clear from the results that the profit can be strongly increased with a multi products 
multi market bidding strategy. 
 
Strategic bidding for generation companies 
-51- 
 
3.3  Conclusions 
 
In a deregulated market generation companies are looking for tools to build strategic bids. 
To answer to this needs, this thesis analyzed the parameters that differenced a profitable bid 
from a non-profitable one. Since one of key parameters is the market price, at first, a neural 
network algorithm for price forecasting is proposed. After a detailed analysis of the 
historical Japanese spot price, the correlation between peak demand and market price was 
individuated. The proposed method integrates a peak demand forecasting with price 
forecasting. 
Once the price forecast is available the generation company has to proceed to develop the 
bids. Generation costs and operation constraints are integrated together in a 
decommissioning algorithm to produce the optimal bids.  
Since players have different characteristics and needs depending on the size of the company 
and the impact on the market, this thesis proposes two approach to the strategic bidding: the 
price-base bid for price takers and the cost-base bid for price maker. 
In addition to the bid strategy for electricity, a multi-product bid optimization algorithm is 
proposed. Generator companies try to increase their profit selling not only electricity but 
also ancillary service such as regulation and reserve. Numerical results show the possible 
increment of profit that a generation company may obtain following the proposed 
methodology.   
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Chapter 4 Generation scheduling for multi-area market 
 
The Japanese electricity market was open to new players for thirty percent of whole 
demand from April 2000. The new rules incentive the instauration of competitive multi 
bilateral trading for electricity. In order to give a wide range of retail choices for final 
customers, bilateral trading was recognized as a suitable model from the point of view of 
dynamic incentive to competition and short-term and long-term stability in the supply. In 
the on-going deregulation of electricity market in Japan, even if utility companies are still 
responsible for transmission operation under their ownership, no one plays a role of 
mandatory type of market operation except than short-term adjustment and ancillary 
services operation. In a certain sense, it is a kind of free market under minimum supply 
regulation conditions. 
Because not only to meet energy balancing requirement for physical trading, but also to 
consider the network logistics such as transmission constraints, losses, and usage price, all 
the market participants owning or operating generators should execute self-scheduling and 
self-dispatch calculation on a long and short term horizon. 
In this thesis, it is proposed a calculation method that helps the supplier companies or 
retailers to obtain the maximum profit from the purchase and sell portfolio in a short term 
prospective. 
 
4.1 Market model 
 
The market that is considered is modeled on the market structure applied in Japan until 
2005. 
A certificated PPS (Power Producer and Supplier) can utilize the transmission lines owned 
by the vertical integrated utility to supply electricity to eligible customers. A PPS can 
produce the electricity by itself or purchase it on a contract base from merchant power 
plants. 
A PPS has the duty to maintain the imbalance between the production and the supply to 
demand in each control area within +/-3% on a 30 minutes interval. To fulfill the balance 
requirement, PPS can control demand or generation in the real time. 
The PPS is allowed to trade the electricity in the same control area or among several control 
areas. Japan is divided in 9 control areas that are connected by tie lines. A PPS can produce 
electricity in a control area and supply it to a customer located in another control area. 
The electricity that is produced in a different area from the demand is subject to the 
wheeling fees and losses based on the MWh that flow. In addition a PPS has to purchase the 
transmission service to have the right to utilize the inter-area transmission lines. 
The advantages of a multi-area environment include the possibility to have a demand curve 
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with a high power factor and the possibility to optimize the utilization of the generation 
fleet. 
Nevertheless there are strict rules that have to be respected: the quantity of electricity 
flowing among areas has to be schedule by the PPS the day before of the real flowing and 
cannot be adjusted in the real time to supply eventual imbalance. As consequence of this 
condition, the day-ahead schedule for PPS becomes of fundamental importance. 
In addition, PPS has to schedule a certain amount of reserve in each area to be able to 
follow the natural fluctuation of the demand in the real time and to supply any discrepancy 
between the forecasted load and the real demand. For this reason it is necessary to keep, in 
each area, a generating unit that can supply regulation, in other words it is necessary to 
have a unit that can be re-dispatched in the real time to ensure the balance between demand 
and supplying.  
 
4.2 Objective function: profit maximization 
 
A PPS is an independent company with the objective to run a profitable and sociable useful 
business. For this reason, this thesis recognized that the main objective of the PPS is the 
maximization of the profit under the constraints that the market rules impose and the 
requests that generation companies and customers can add to the contracts. 
I want to focus on the short-term profit maximization and, in particular, on the formulation 
of the model and on the solution approach of the consumption/power plant production 
schedule and dispatch under the assumption that contracts with generation and demand are 
already stipulated and fixed; in other words the I do not intend to evaluate contracts, but I 
want to study the profit maximization under the contracts constraints. 
The same model can be extended to a long-term scenario and contracts in both the purchase 
side and selling side of the business evaluated together.  
Regarding the short term prospective, it is possible to write the objective function as the 
maximization of the difference between the total income and the total costs. 
 
( )∑∑ ∑ −− ),()()(max QDTQCDR         
,where  
D = demand of a customer 
Q = output level of a generator 
 
The first term R represents the revenue from the sale of electricity to the demand, the 
second term C represents the costs that the PPS has to effort to purchase electricity from 
generators (or to produce electricity if the power plants are owned) and the third T is the 
total expenses for transmission use. The above equation represents the net profit of the PPS. 
The variables in the objective function are the output level for each generator or purchase 
contract Q and the customers demand D in case that the contract with customers allowed 
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energy dispatch. 
 
4.3 Multi area modeling for generation 
 
As it was explain in the previous section, a PPS can utilize a single generating unit to 
supply electricity in several control areas; nevertheless the costs to supply electricity in 
each area is a function of the generation production and of the quantity that is wheeled.  
To evaluate properly the weight of costs such as wheeling fess, the generation output is 
decomposed in the sum of the quantity that the generator supply in each area; in Figure 26, 
this concept is schematically described. 
 
Figure 26: Generation modeling for multi-area 
 
In other words, I proposed to approach the optimization problem, decomposing the 
generator or purchase contract quantity in a number of sub-quantities equal to the number 
of areas in which the PPS is operating. 
The generator produces the total quantity Q=Q1+Q2+Q3 but the costs, meant as summation 
of production costs and transmission costs for each individual sub-quantity, are different 
since subject to wheeling fee and losses. 
The quantities Q1,Q2 and Q3 are subject to the constraints of the contracted transmission 
services. 
This model for generation permits to evaluate all the costs and constraints in the 
optimization process and, at the same time, to track the quantities that flow from each 
generating unit in each control area. 
In addition, at least a generator for each control area has to be able to supply a certain 
quantity of regulation to adjust the possible fluctuation of the load in the real time. 
Load
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Each unit is informed about the schedule that has to be performed in the operating day; the 
wheeling schedule has to be supplied to the system operator and it is utilized to set the 
power flow level P0 for each interconnection line. The system operator of each control area 
needs to know the P0 of each interconnection to perform the frequency control in the real 
time. In the Japanese market, PPSs are asked to submit the wheeling schedule for each 
generator or contract at least at 12:00 of one day before the delivery day.  
 
4.4 Generation scheduling problem 
 
This thesis focus on the generation scheduling for the day-ahead, but easily, the problem 
can be extended to the load scheduling and dispatching as well. 
 
4.4.1 Objective function 
The objective function is the maximization of the profit; it is possible to rewrite the profit 
equation as function of the quantities Q output of the generating units, described in the 
previous section. Assuming that the costs for production are a linear function of the output 
level Q and it may change in the time and that the price is different from customer to 
customer and in the time, the objective function is expressed as follow. 
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,where 
Dj,t: demand j at time t 
Pi,t: price of selling to demand j at time t 
C1i,t: the generation cost of generation i at time t  
Qi,t,a: the production of generation i for control area a at time t 
C2i,t,a: the wheeling fee to send the production of generation i to control area a at time t 
Spi: start up cost of generator i 
Ui,t: the status of generator i at time t (1=generator on, 0=generator off) 
C3i,t: the price of generator i to support regulation at time t 
Regi,t: regulation quantity of generator i at time t 
 
The output of each generating unit Qi,t is calculated as the summation of the Qi,t,a. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the cost function is a linear one. The assumption is 
consistent with the fact that almost all the contracts between generation companies and PPS 
include only a price for kWh. The model can be easily modified to consider other type of 
 
Generation scheduling for multi-area market 
-58- 
cost function such as quadratic.  
 
4.4.2 Virtual generator 
If the PPS cannot supply the customers with its own generation capacity and contracts or if 
the production exceed the demand because of contract condition in same time interval, the 
PPS schedule operator can decide to purchase electricity or regulation from the utility 
operating in the control area or, in case of excess production, to sell electricity to the utility. 
To take in account this possibility, in the proposed approach, the utilities are modeled as 
virtual generating units with infinite capacity of production or absorption and without any 
kind of constraints. A virtual generator and a virtual demand are set for each area in which 
the PPS is operating. The price for the virtual generators is set as the value published in the 
tariff of each utility company and the virtual demand-selling price is set equal 0. The 
production of the virtual generator is constrained to be consumed in the same control area 
and cannot be wheeled in another area since the Japanese utilities required that the balance 
has to be kept in each area. 
 
4.4.3 Constraints 
The total generation production has to be in balance with the total demand and total losses 
in each time period 
 
( )( ) tDlossQ
j
tjaiati
ia
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,where 
lossi,a: percentage of losses for generator i to send electricity to area a. 
 
In each area the minimum regulation requirement has to be supply by the generators located 
in that area  
taRegReg atti
ai
,,, ∀=∑
∈
               
,where 
Regt,a: regulation requirement for area a at time t 
 
When a unit is start-up, it is constrained to run for a minimum number of hours, in addition 
when a unit is shut down, it will not be able to start-up again immediately but it will require 
a minimum number of hours of non-operation. 
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Xi
on: the number of time periods that the unit i was on until time t-1 
Xi
off: number of time periods that the unit i was off until time t-1 
Ti
minup: the minimum number of time periods that the unit i has to run 
Ti
mindn: the minimum number of time periods that the unit i has to be off. 
 
A unit or a demand can set a maximum level and a minimum level of operation: 
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,where 
Qi
min: minimum output of generator i 
Qi
max: maximum output of generator I 
Dj
min: minimum consumption of demand j 
Dj
max: maximum consumption of demand j 
 
The operator may force a generator to be on line to follow the must-run requirement of a 
contract introducing a must-run condition. 
The total electricity flowing from an area to another can be subject to transmission capacity 
constraints due to physical limits or contract limitation. For simplicity I assumed that the 
transmission constraints are individual for each generator or contract. It is possible to 
extend the concept constrains for a group of contract or generators if needed. 
 
taiQQ atiati ,,,,,, ∀≤  
,where 
 
Qi,t,a: contract limit of wheeling of generation i to area a at time t 
 
In addition, each unit has to respect the ramp rate constraints both for electricity and 
regulation 
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where, 
Rumpupi: maximum output change of generator i in one minute 
∆t: interval in which the generator i have to supply the regulation 
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4.5 Solution approach 
 
The problem can be recognized as a mixed integer/continues ones. The PPS has to decide 
which unit to use and at which level to dispatch the units and the demands. 
The decision variables related to the dispatch of each generating unit and each consumer 
are continues, and on the other hand, the decision variables to use or not a unit or to supply 
or not a demand are integer. 
The solution for the continuous variables is approached by linear programming method and 
the integer variables are searched using a dynamic programming approach. The two 
calculation techniques are integrated in an iteration process to obtain the optimal solution 
through the so-called decommissioning approach. At the initial points all the generating 
units are set as running and all the demands as to be supplied. Units and demands will be 
stopped or not supplied one by one if they will be evaluated as not profitable for the PPS. 
The liner program calculation and the dynamic programming algorithm are linked with the 
economical parameter λ, which is the langrangian multiplier of the balance constrains. 
 
4.6 Numerical simulation  
 
The proposed model is applied to a company that is trading in 3 areas. It is supposed that 
the company is contracting with 3 generators and own 2 generators. The company is 
contracting with 20 demands for supplying the electricity at a fix price. Let’s supposed that 
the selling price is 9¥/kWh. 
 
Table 5 Generating unit data 
 Qmin 
(MW) 
Q
max 
(MW) 
Rampup 
(kW/min) 
T
mindn 
(h) 
T
minup 
(h) 
C1 
(¥/kWh) 
Sp 
(¥) 
Unit 1 1 15 1 3 4 4 0 
Unit 2 1 15 1 2 3 7.1 0 
Unit 3 1 15 1 3 4 6.2 0 
Unit 4 1 15 1 2 2 6.9 0 
Unit 5 1 15 1 1 1 8.5 0 
 
Table 5 lists the characteristics of each generator and the production costs that the PPS has 
to effort. For simplicity it is assumed that the generation cost is independent of time and 
that there are not start-up costs. 
In Figure 27, the location of the units, the wheeling fees and the losses are illustrated. 
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Figure 27: Generation units’ distribution, fees and losses 
 
Losses are set between 1 and 2.2% and wheeling fee between 0.5 and 1 ¥/kWh. Looking at 
the data in Table 5 and at the information in Figure 27, it is possible to see that the cheapest 
electricity is in area A and area B has the most expensive one.  
It is supposed that the PPS has already reserve 10MW of transmission capacity between 
area 1 and area 2, 10MW between area 2 and area 3 and 10 MW between area 3 and area 1. 
From the simulation, I wanted to calculate the total profit on 24 hours, and compare it with 
the profit that the same PPS will get under the same condition but without the multi-area 
optimization, in other words, considering that the PPS has not reserved any transmission 
capacity. 
The minimum time interval that it is considered is 30 minutes. 
Since it is assumed that the demand price is fixed and that demand cannot be curtailed, the 
PPS has to forecast the consumption of each demand contract to solve the multi-area 
dispatching and scheduling problem. 
Figure 28 plots the forecasted load for the 3 areas; the demand is high in area A and low in 
area B and C. 
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Figure 28: Load for each area. 
The regulation requirement is set at 1% of the load for each area. 
Figure 29 shows the output of each generation in each 30 minutes interval; it is clear that 
unit 5 is shut down all the time since too expensive. Unit 4 and unit 2 are requested to run 
to supply the required regulation in their area, but the output is very closed to the minimum 
output level. Unit 1 supply the most of electricity during all the day. Unit 3 is started up in 
the morning to follow the load increasing and shut down in the evening when the load 
decrease. 
Figure 29: Generation output 
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In Figure 30, the production for each generator and the track of the flow is represented for 
an off-peak time interval and peak time interval; 0:00 and 12:00 were selected. It is evident 
that the tendency is to export electricity from area A to area B and C. During the off-peak 
period unit 1 is wheeling electricity to areas A and B, in the peak time interval, both the unit 
1 and 3 supply electricity to area B were only expensive generators are available.  
 
A: Time period 0:00 
B: Time period 12:00 
Figure 30: Unit output tracking in 2 snap shots 
 
The total profit for the PPS for the 24 hours simulation is: 2,026,055 ¥. The same 
simulation was performed under the assumption that the PPS has not reserved any 
transmission capacity, in other words without applying the multi-area optimization 
approach. In this case the total profit was estimated to be 1,750,088 ¥.  
Utilizing the opportunity to wheel electricity among control areas through the proposed 
multi-area approach it is possible to increases the profit for the PPS of more than 15%. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
 
An approach to the generation and wheeling schedule for PPS was proposed. To evaluate 
properly the costs associated with the wheeling fees and the transmission losses, the 
generation output variable was decomposed in its wheeling component for each area. 
The proposed method was recognized to be efficient and profitable. A PPS can increase the 
total profit evaluating in the proper way all the constraints and the profit possibility; for this 
reason, this method is deployed in computer software and delivered to PPSs that utilize it in 
the daily scheduling process.  
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Chapter 5 The congestion management problem 
 
The rapid deregulation of the electricity industry in the last two decades has produced the 
formation of several markets around the world. Following the example of other 
commodities, the electricity market is commonly managed by an exchange that publishes 
daily the traded quantities and the market prices. Unfortunately, electricity cannot be 
exchange freely because it has to be traded subject to the physical constraints of the 
transmission network. These constraints can cause congestions. 
The problem of transmission congestion is particularly relevant to interconnections among 
power system control areas. It is a matter of fact that interconnections among control areas 
were developed with the objective to increase the stability of the power system. 
Interconnected networks have the advantage to support frequency control and emergency 
procedures. The capacity of the interconnection was designed for the previous described 
scope and not for trading. However, due to deregulation of the market and the increase of 
the number of transmission users, the utilization of the interconnections has changed from 
frequency support to trading support: transmission lines are the highways of electricity. 
Market players dispatch generating resources with the objective to increment their own 
economic benefit. For this reason, it is common that the transfer capacity requested to 
transfer electricity from a control area to another control area exceeds the transfer capability 
of the interconnection line between the two areas. 
In other words, it can be said that the transmission congestion problem is caused by the 
conflict of interests among the market players: limited transmission resources have to be 
allocated to several independent players, all of them operating with the intent to 
improve their own profit. 
In case of insufficient transfer capacity among control areas, it is then necessary to 
introduce rules to manage the congestion on the transmission lines. A congestion 
management method has to be able to relief the overflow on the transmission lines and, at 
the same time, to give a strong economical signal to the transmission user. This economic 
signal is worldwide recognized as the difference of the electricity price between congested 
areas. 
 
5.1  The forward market 
 
In a continuous auction type of market it is impossible to use a pure market split approach 
for the congestion management because the transactions are sequential in the time and the 
contracts are bilateral, and further market split evaluation cannot be performed. 
Nevertheless several forward markets around the world have adopted a continuous auction 
(zaraba) mechanism to manage the market itself. The congestion management is 
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approached in several ways. A common approach is to create a financial market. Nord Pool 
and the German Power exchange EEX adopted this kind of approach. The electricity is 
traded only as a financial good and not delivered. The objective to trade in the financial 
market is to hedge the risk associated with the spot market.  
Other approaches to the transmission congestion problem include flow gate and 
transmission right trading. In these approaches, a parallel market for flow gate or 
transmission rights, have to be managed with the electricity market. It may create 
complexity and difficulties in the market monitoring and in the trading itself.  
To avoid the demerit associated with the already implemented methods, I proposed a new 
methodology based on a power flow calculation that allowed managing the electricity 
market and the transmission congestion at the same time.  
 
5.1.1 Concept of hub 
The basic concept is the introduction of several exchanges hubs connected by physical 
transmission lines. The concept fit particularly with the Japanese network and with the 
areas defined in the Japanese spot market. Each control area can be seen as a hub in the 
forward market and as a zone in the spot market. Any player can sell or buy electricity in 
each hub subject to the condition of available transfer capability.  
The available transfer capability for each inter-tie may be supplied to the power exchange 
by ESCJ every morning before starting the trading day. After the closing of the trading day, 
the power exchange may inform ESCJ about the transactions that were fixed during the day. 
The available transfer capability can be updated, thought the trading day, by JEPX instantly 
at the moment that a transaction is finalized.  
The method will automatically drive the price of congested hubs at a higher level compared 
with the price of no-congested hubs.  
The market operator may reconfigure the hubs and the interconnection, following the 
moves in the market. If power system operators individuate new congested areas, new hubs 
can be created. 
Followings are descriptions of the concept of the hub configuration with an example. 
Figure 31 is a simple representation of a possible structure. A board, as represented in Table 
6 is available for each hub. Players can post bid in any hub but the bid has to include in 
addition to the price and the quantity, information about the delivery or withdraw location 
(hub).   
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Figure 31: Hubs and connections 
Firstly, it is assumed that at the current trading time, the orders listed in Table 6 are posted 
in Hub No. 3 and the location of the orders is the same Hub No. 3. 
Table 6: Example of posted orders 
 Buy 
MWh 
Price 
¥/kWh 
Sell 
MWh 
 30 180 
 28 100 
 25 155 
100 20  
170 18  
 
Secondly, it is assumed the available transfer capability to be 50 MW for all the three 
interconnections and that the impedance for each interconnection is the same, through a 
simple power flow calculation it can be examined that a player is able to sell from Hub No. 
1 a maximum of 75 MWh at 20¥/kWh: 50 MW flow from Hub No. 1 to Hub No. 3 on 
connection 1, 25 MW flow from Hub No.1 to Hub No. 3 through Hub No.2 on connection 2 
and 3 as shown in Figure 32-a. Once the transaction is fixed, the available transfer 
capability for each interconnection has to be updated. The available transfer capability has 
to be set to 0 MW for the connection 1 and to 25 MW for the connection 2 and 3. 
Since the continues auction is a sequential process, it may happen that another transaction 
of 30 MW is scheduled from Hub 2 to Hub 1 after the previous transaction is processed. 
Because this transaction is in counter flow on connection 1 with respect to the previous 
transaction and transfers the same flow of the previous transaction on connection 2, the 
available transfer capability can be upgraded as: 10 MW from Hub No. 1 to 3 on 
connection 1, 45 MW from Hub No 2 to 3 on connection 2 and 15 MW from Hub No.2 to 3 
on connection 3. 
At this time it is possible to trade more 15 MW from Hub No. 3 to Hub No. 1 for 20¥/kWh 
Hub
No. 1
Hub
No. 2
Hub
No. 3
Connection 2 Connection 3
Connection1
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(Figure 32-b). 
In case the available capacity on the connection 1 persists to be 0 MW, players that try to 
buy electricity in Hub 3 automatically have to purchase from high price offers (in the 
example 25¥/kWh or more) and, on the other hand, players who are located in Hub No. 1 
and Hub No. 2, that intend to sell electricity are forced to sell it in their own hub. 
 
(a) Transaction for player A                    (b) Supplementary transaction 
Figure 32: The available transfer capability before and after the transactions 
 
Since the number of transaction may be very high and for each hub it is possible to have 
many products (weekly forward, monthly forward and so on) that all utilize the same 
connection schema, it is fundamental that the update process of the available capability is 
fast. For this reason and for keeping the market liquidity higher it is important to have a 
small number of hubs. 
 
5.1.2  Match quantity calculation 
The fundamental concept in the calculation process is that all the transactions are processed 
sequentially. This assumption is consistent with the continuous auction rules adopted by 
JEPX, since, in the continuous auction, each transaction is decided independently and 
sequentially following the price merit priority and the posting time priority. 
Each order is defined by 6 parameters: 
- kind of product (in the same market several product may be traded, in the Japanese 
forward market monthly peak and base products are available) 
- player name 
- location (it will be considered as source for an ask and as sink for a bid) 
- order type (bid for buying and ask for selling) 
- price for unit (¥/kWh) 
- quantity (MW) 
 
- Determination of the transaction quantity  
When two orders can be matched in a transaction a simple power flow calculation is 
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performed for each time period that composes the product.  
The ask order location is recognized as the source and the bid order location is recognized 
as the sink. All the transactions already processed are ignored. 
The power flowing on each connection is individuated and compared with the available 
transfer capability between hubs. The transaction quantity is then fixed at the minimum 
quantity that satisfies all the transmission constraints and the order quantities. In formula:  
 
( )nt jit jiaskbidt QQQQQ →→= .......,,,max 1            
where, 
bidQ = quantity to purchase by the bid order 
askQ = quantity to sell by the ask order 
it
jiQ → = maximum quantity that can be transferred from location of the source i to location of 
the sink j at time period ti  
n = total number of time periods 
jiQ →  is calculated for each time period using a power flow calculation as follow: 
jiQ → iQmax                                 
ATCQH
QQ
ts
ji
≤⋅
−=
.
 
 
, where iQ  is the quantity from the source hub i, jQ  is the quantity at the sink hub j, H is 
the transfer admittance matrix that transforms the power at each hub in the flow on each 
line, Q is the vector of the hubs injection (the only 2 elements are at hub i and hub j), and 
ATC is the vector of the transfer available capability for each interconnection line. 
 
- Upgrade of the ATC values 
Once the transaction quantity is decided, the opposite process is performed to find the real 
flow on each interconnection and to upgrade the ATC values: 
 
tnew
QHATCATC ⋅−=                        
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,where 
t
Q  is the vector of the power injection at each hub (+ tQ  at hub i, and - tQ at hub j) 
In case of simple networks, the calculation may be performed in a few milliseconds. 
 
- Upgrade of the posted order 
Once that the ATC are upgraded, it may happen that some of the posted orders become 
non-deliverable or non-transmittable. A calculation similar to the one described in the 
determination of the transaction quantity is then performed on each order to determine the 
availability of the transmission capacity. In this calculation the counter party location is set 
as the hub location. 
All the ask order that cannot be delivered and all the bid order that cannot be satisfied 
transmission capacity limitation have to be temporary deleted from the posted information 
in order to avoid the possibility to give a wrong signal to the participants. The orders may 
be reposted in case of congestion relief or the players may cancel them. 
Speediness in the upgrade of the ATC process and in the upgrade of the posted order 
process is a fundamental issue. Players may follow inappropriate behaviors if the 
information about both transfer capabilities and orders are not correct or delay in the time. 
For this reason, I concentrated on a method that can manage the transmission capability and 
can be performed in a short time span. 
 
5.1.3 Operation constraints 
In the previous session, the base case in which all the inter-ties are in alternating current 
was described.  
The Japanese inter-ties have a minimum flow to be respected, and in some case, they can be 
operated only in a discrete way (for example the FC interconnection between Tokyo 
Electric and Chubu Electric must be operated as multiple of 20 MW). The DC 
interconnections can be operated at a fix flow independently from the network 
configuration. For this reason, the kinds of constraints, previously described, can be easily 
integrated in the method adding the following constraints: 



 ∀≥
=
otherwise
kQQifQ
Q kttt
0
           
,where kQ is the minimum flow constraint on each DC connection k. 
 
5.1.4  Tests result 
The described model was utilized in a simulation game to testify the efficiency of it. Ten 
players were involved in the simulation. They were selected among professionals with back 
ground on the energy market.  
To each player, a role was assigned in the market. The players were divided in: 
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- retailers (4 players) 
- generation companies (4 players) 
 - traders (2 players) 
The resources were divided in two hubs linked by an interconnection with a capacity of 100 
MW. 
The hub 1 was characterized as an area with cheap generation capacity and small demand. 
On the contrary, hub 2 had large demand and expensive generation capacity. The simulation 
intent was to verify that after a few transactions the interconnection between hub 1 and hub 
2 would be congested and the prices in the 2 hubs would diverge.  
The players were trading hourly MW for the following day. Figure 33 is a simple 
representation of the simulated market. 
 
Figure 33: Market model 
 
The players were informed about the total demand for each hub, the available transfer 
capability of the interconnection between the two hubs and the range of costs of generation 
(25-45 ¥/kWh). 
The simulation session was ranging over 6 hours. During the session the retailers were 
asked to buy a quantity of electricity equal to the contracted demand. 
Figure 34 represents the plotting of the price during the simulation. 
It is evident from the graph that during the first 2 hours of the simulation the price in the 
two hubs is almost the same. Basically the electricity is sold from players located in hub 1 
in both hubs. Once the interconnection is full the market is suddenly split and the prices in 
the two hubs change drastically. 
In hub 1 the price decreases due to a strong competition of the generation companies; on 
the contrary, in hub 2 the price increase since the only generation capacity available has 
high cost.  
The market mechanism gives a right signal of the physical situation. Players can easily 
understand looking at the price trend in each hub that the price difference between the two 
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hubs is caused by congestion.  
 
Figure 34: Comparison of the price trend in the two hubs 
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5.2  The spot market 
 
For the spot market a pure market split approach is proposed. The technique developed in 
this thesis assures an optimal market solution and at the same time reduce drastically the 
calculation time. 
 
5.2.1  Auction rules in markets 
The single price auction mechanism is often utilized to set the market price in an electricity 
day-ahead market. The objective is to find the single market price that maximizes the 
quantity of electricity exchanged in the market and the consequent quantity that may be 
contracted by each player. The price is built using the market participants’ order prices. 
An order is defined by the price-quantity pair and the position (offer or bid). An offer order 
is a will to sell a certain quantity of electricity at a price equal or higher than the offer price. 
On the contrary, a bid order is a will to buy a certain amount of electricity at a price equal 
or lower than the bid price. 
Market participants’ orders are collected until a predetermined time called gate close. After 
the gate close, the market operators process all the order to find the market price and the 
contract quantity for each order. 
In a single price auction, the market price and the contract quantity for each order have to 
be set respecting the following conditions described in the following equations. 
The conditions for an offer order are: 
 
offercontractmarketoffer
contractmarketoffer
offercontractmarketoffer
quantityquantitypriceprice
quantitypriceprice
quantityquantitypriceprice
≤≤=
=>
=<
0
0  
 
,where priceoffer and quantityoffer are the price-quantity pair of the offer order, pricemarket is 
the price for the market and quantitycontract is the quantity that the player sell. 
In a similar way, the conditions for a bid are: 
 
bidcontractmarketbid
contractmarketbid
bidcontractmarketbid
quantityquantitypriceprice
quantitypriceprice
quantityquantitypriceprice
≤≤=
=<
=>
0
0  
 
In other words, the formula expresses the concept that any seller will not sell at a price that 
is lower than his offer price, and any buyer will not buy at a price higher than his bid price. 
The objective of maximization of the exchange quantity does not ensure the uniqueness of 
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the solution. For this reason it is necessary to introduce additional rules to set the final 
market solution. In this thesis, it will be assumed that in case of multi-solution the lowest 
price that satisfies the previous described constraints is selected as the market price. 
In some cases, at the market price, the total offer quantity may not be equal to the bid one. 
The excess of quantity in the offer or bid side is defined as a surplus. The surplus is 
distributed among orders with the price equal to the market price in a proportional way. 
This thesis implemented a sequential approach to calculate the market price and the 
contract quantity for each order. The method can be described in 4 steps as bellows: 
 
1) sort all the bid and offer prices from the highest to the lowest. 
2) calculate the aggregated sell and buy quantity for each price. 
3) calculate the tradable quantity for each price as the minimum between the aggregated 
sell and buy quantity 
4) select the price that correspond the maximum tradable quantity. If two or more prices 
have the same maximum tradable quantity, the price with the smallest surplus (aggregated 
sell/buy quantity) is selected. 
 
Once the price and the total trade are individuated, the contract quantity for each player is 
calculated using the condition expressed by the winning conditions. 
Figure 35 is a graphical representation of the sequential process results. The market price, 
which is a solution of the described algorithm, satisfies the condition to be the cross point 
between bids and offers curves. 
The proposed method is a practical algorithm that can be easily implemented on a computer 
system.  
Similar algorithms are implemented and performed daily in commodities and stocks 
exchanges. 
 
Figure 35: Market price calculation 
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5.2.2 Market splitting 
One of the main differences between electricity and the other commodities is that electricity 
has to be transferred through transmission lines. The auction algorithm, described in the 
previous section, does not consider any constraints related with the transmission network. 
In reality, an order, in addition to the quantity, the price, includes also another important 
information: the location. From a power system point of view, the location of an order can 
be considered as: 
 
the source point in case of a sell order 
the sink point in case of a buy order. 
 
It may happen that, the solution produced by the previous described algorithm may not 
respect some of the constraints on the transmission lines. In this case it is necessary to split 
the market in two sub-markets with different prices to ensure that the constraints are 
respected and the transmission lines are utilized optimally.  
Figure 36 represents a simple example with 2 areas connected by a transmission line. In Area 
1, a player offers a quantity of electricity equal to Qoffer at Poffer (offer price), in Area 2 a 
player bids a quantity of electricity equal to Qbid at Pbid. The trade quantity is the minimum 
between Qoffer and Qbid if the bid price is higher than the offer price, 0 otherwise. In this 
example the trade quantity between offer and bid corresponds to the power flowing 
between Area 1 and 2. 
In formula: 


 >
==
otherwise
PPifQQ
QQ
offerbidofferbid
flowtrade
0
),min(
  
If the trade quantity Qflow is bigger than the transmission line capacity Qlimit, the solution is 
not acceptable from a transmission network point of view. In this case, the market has to be 
split in two sub-markets and the auction calculation performed again for each of them. As 
consequence of the market split the price in the area that is the exporting electricity (Area 1 
in this case) has to be lower or equal to the market price without transmission constraint 
consideration, in a similar way the price in the area that is importing electricity will see a 
price higher or equal to the unconstrained market price. 
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Figure 36: Congested market example 
 
To ensure the best utilization of the transmission line, the concept of virtual offer and 
virtual bid is introduced. 
A virtual offer is an offer at low price (lowest offer price in the auction – 0.1) and quantity 
equal to the Qlimit, located in the area that is importing electricity. A virtual bid is a bid at 
high price (highest bid price in the auction + 0.1) and quantity equal to Qlimit, located in the 
area that is exporting electricity. Figure 37 shows how the market may be split introducing 
virtual bid and offer.  
Figure 37: Market split 
 
After the introduction of the virtual bid and the virtual offer, the two sub-markets, Area 1 
and Area 2, are completely independent and the auction algorithm can be performed to 
calculate the market price and the total trade quantity for each of them.  
As it is represented in Figure 38, since Qlimit is smaller than Qflow, the price in Area 1 Parea1 
becomes lower than the market price before the market splitting Pmarket, on the contrary the 
price in Area 2 Parea2 becomes higher.  
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Figure 38: Prices in the areas 
 
Once the auction algorithm described in the previous section is performed and the potential 
transaction quantity for each order is calculated, it is possible to calculate the net difference 
between satisfied sell orders and satisfied buy orders inside each area (net import or net 
export) with the following equation: 
 
In case of radial networks, the flow on each transmission line can be easily calculated using 
the topology information and the quantities pi.  
 
5.2.3 Congested submarket identification 
In the previous section, the market split concept was described for a market composed by 
two areas. In this case, it is easy to recognize the congested path and the location of the 
market split. The problem becomes more complex in case of 3 or more areas. Figure 39 is 
an example of market with 4 areas. It is not trivial to find the location of the market split 
that maximizes the trading quantity under the rules described in 5.2.1.  
It seems that the interconnection between Area 2 and Area 3 is the most congested 
interconnection with an overflow of 115MW. In reality, solving the congestion on 
interconnections 1-2 and 4-2 will automatically relief the connection on interconnection 2-3 
without any needs to split the market between Area 2 and Area 3. 
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Figure 39: Market with 4 areas and 3 congested interconnections 
 
To individuate the position of the splits, this research proposes an algorithm that is 
described in the next sections. 
 
- Area type identification 
First of all, I want to introduce the concept of import, export and neutral constrained area.  
For each area a parameter ti (congestion index) is calculated. 
Where i is the index of the area, pi is the net quantity of the area i previously described, j is 
the index for interconnection with flow with the direction to the area i and k is the index for 
interconnection with the flow from the area i, Qlimit is the maximum capacity of the 
interconnection in the direction of the flow and Qflow is the quantity that will flow on the 
transmission line as result of the auction calculation without any constraint on the network. 
An area is defined congested in export (E) if the congestion index t is bigger than 0, 
congested in import (I) if t is lower than 0 and neutral to the congestion (N) in case of t 
equal 0. 
From the equation, it is easy to understand that an area defined as congested in export is an 
area for which the quantity of electricity that can import plus the net quantity of the area 
itself is bigger than the quantity that it can transfer or export to others area. Similarly for an 
import area, the net quantity of the area itself pi summed to the quantity that may be 
transferred to other areas is lower than the quantity that it is able to import due to the 
transmission constraints. In Figure 40, examples of each kind of areas are described.  
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It can be demonstrated as consequence of the balance condition of the power system that if 
in a system, one or more areas are export area, then it exists at least one area that is an 
import one and vice versa (Appendix 2). 
 
Figure 40: Representation of export, import and neutral areas 
 
-System reduction and splitting rules 
In the previous section, it was described the definition of areas as import, export and neutral. 
In this section the rules for splitting are introduced. Two area interconnected by the same 
line should be split in two separated markets if and only if the area which is transferring 
electricity to the other area is an export constrained area and the area which is receiving 
electricity is an import area. 
The rule can be explained intuitively with the help of a graphical support. In Figure 41, all 
the possible combination of areas as node of the same interconnection is described. An 
import area is represented with a round mark and a barrier on the left that means the 
impossibility to get all the electricity required, an export area by a round mark and barrier 
on the right that means the impossibility to transfer all electricity that is required. A neutral 
area does not have any barrier. The arrow between the areas represents the direction of the 
power flow on the interconnection line. From the figure it can be said that in the case of 
Export-Import combination, the split of the two areas in two market will has as 
consequence a reduction of the power flowing between the two areas. The export area will 
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then export less power and the import area, import less power reducing, in this way the 
congestion condition of both the two areas; in any other case in Figure 41, the split of the 
two areas will not be of benefit for both or neither for one of the area (for example in the 
import-export combination). 
Figure 41: The matrix of the splitting rules 
 
It is possible to demonstrate mathematical that splitting combination of import-export, 
import-import or export-export may cause an increase of system congestion and an 
inversion of prices (an area exporting electricity may have a market price higher than an 
area importing electricity) in case of radial network (Appendix 2).  
A system reduction algorithm is introduced with the objective to recognize easily the 
location of the export-import interconnection that has to be split. 
For each interconnection in the system, if the areas that delimitated the interconnection are 
of the same kind, they will be merged in one area. A neutral area has to be merged with an 
export area if it is connected with one export area, otherwise it can be merged with an 
import area. 
In Figure 42, the example of Figure 39 is reduced to a simple system. The connected areas 
2 and 3, both import areas, are merged in a new area 2+3. After the merging the system is 
reduced in a 3 areas one with 2 interconnection of type export-import. 
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Figure 42: Example of system reduction 
 
-Loops Transformation 
In the previous section the identification of the congested area was described. The method 
is applicable only for radial network. In case of loops it is necessary to transform the 
topology in an equivalent radial network. For loops composed by 3 areas and at least one 
DC interconnection it is possible to utilize a delta-star transformation with the introduction 
of a virtual area in the center of the star. Figure 43 is an example of transformation. The 
capacity of each interconnection line in the star configuration is equal to the sum of 
capacity of the line of the area itself. Similarly, the power flow can be calculated as the sum 
of the power flow on each line.  
The virtual area is an area with net power production equal 0. Since it is assumed that at 
least on of the interconnection is a DC connection, the power flow of the loop can be solved 
without the introduction of the induction matrix but introducing a standard rule. In this 
thesis, we assume that the DC connection has a priority respect to the other 
interconnections in the loop. 
350MW200MW
100MW 235MW
offer:200MW offer:50MW bid:350MW
offer:100MW
100 MW
80MW
Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
Area 4
Export
Export
Import Import
Area 4
Export
Area 1
Export Area 2+3
Import
 
 The congestion management problem 
-83- 
Figure 43: Delta-Star transformation 
 
In other world, the loop power flow is calculated maximizing the power flow on the DC 
transmission line. 
The assumption to have only loops with at least one DC transmission is consistent with the 
Japanese network topology.  
 
5.2.4 Application to a small system 
In this section an example of application to a system with 5 areas, 5 interconnections and 9 
players is presented.  
The network configuration and the player orders are shown in Figure 44. An order with a 
positive quantity is an offer (sell order); a negative quantity is associated to a bid (buy 
order). 
Cheap electricity is offered from area 1 and 2, and the buyers are mainly located in area 4 
and 5. The line between area 3 and 4 is a DC interconnection. 
In Table 7, the sort of the order based on the price and the system solution without network 
constraints is presented. The tradable quantity is maximized for a system price of 8.5 and 
the associated total tradable quantity is 650 MW. 
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Figure 44: Example system 
 
Table 7: Market solution without network constraints 
Aggregated sell Sell Price Buy Aggregated buy Tradable quantity 
1000 350 8.9 300 300 300 
650 150 8.5 350 650 650 
500  8.2 90 740 400 
500  8  740 400 
500 150 7.8  740 400 
350 100 7.2  740 150 
250  6.7 40 780 150 
250 250 6.3  780 150 
 
Based on the system price of 8.5 it is possible to calculate the trading quantity for each 
player. Players 1, 3, 5 and 8 offered electricity at a price lower than the market price, for 
this reason, they are able to sell electricity, player 4 offered at 8.9 a price higher than the 
market price, for this reason the tradable quantity is 0.  
The solution of the power flow calculation associated with the market price equal 8.5 and 
the total tradable quantity of 650 MW is graphically described in Figure 45. A large 
quantity of electricity is exported by area 1 and 2 to area 4 and 5. In addition of the power 
flow data, Figure 45 shows the tradable quantity for each player. 
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Figure 45: Power Flow 
The power flowing on lines 2-3, 3-4 and 2-4 cannot be determinate. Utilizing the delta-star 
transformation the system can be modeled as in Figure 46. As consequence of the 
transformation a new area, the virtual area V is introduced. 
 
Figure 46: Area types and system reduction 
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After calculating the area type and reducing the system it is evident that Area 1, 2, 3 and the 
virtual area can be reduced in an export congested area and area 4 and 5 in an import 
congested area. The system can be then divided in 2 submarkets, the first composed by area 
1, 2 and 3, the second by area 4 and 5. To divide the submarket is necessary to introduce the 
virtual offers and bids. In area 2 a virtual bid of 150 MW and price of 9 is introduced, 
similarly in area 3 a virtual bid of 150 MW and the price of 9 is build. A virtual offer of 300 
MW is introduced in area 4. The 2 submarkets can now be solved independently using the 
algorithm described in 5.2.1. The final market solution with the price for each area and the 
trade quantity for each player is described in Figure 47. 
 
Figure 47: Final solution 
 
As consequence on the congestion area 1, 2 and 3 have a low price of 7.2, all the players in 
those areas buy and sell electricity at the same price 7.2. Area 4 and 5 sow a higher price 
8.5. Because of the congestion on the loop player 6 is not able to buy all the quantity that he 
was asking, and player 1 is not selling electricity. The transmission capacity of lines 2-4 and 
3-4 is utilized completely, other lines only partially. In particular I would like to point out 
how the congestion on line 1-2 that was present in the first solution without constraints is 
automatically relieved by the split of the 2 submarkets. 
In this example with few areas only one split was enough to solve the market; in general, 
depending from the complexity of the system, it may happen that in the submarkets created 
after the split, some lines are still congested. In these cases it is necessary to apply the same 
algorithm to the submarket and to divide it in other submarket until when all the 
transmission congestion are not cleared. 
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5.2.5  Application to the Japanese market 
The proposed congestion management algorithm was tested on a full-scale model for the 
Japanese market. It was assume that 50 players compete in the market. This assumption is 
quite closed to the actual players of the Japanese Exchange; at the current moment 36 
players are active in JEPX. The network model is developed based on the information 
available on the ESCJ site. The nine control areas, in which Japan is divided, are connected 
with ten transmission lines. East and west Japan are connected with a frequency change 
asset. Three inter-ties are direct current transmission lines. 
The available capacity of each interconnection is sized based on the total size on the 
interconnection. The bids are create randomly and do not contain any strategies or players 
information. Figure 48 is a graphic representation of the assumed model. 
 
Figure 48: Japanese Market Model 
Following the process previously described, first the market is cleared without considering 
the transmission network constraints. The solution of this first step produce the system 
marginal price, the trading quantity for each player and the power flow on each 
transmission line. In Figure 49 the solution of the first step is presented. Loops with three 
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nodes are modified in radial network with the delta-start transformation.  
 
Figure 49: Solution without transmission constraints 
The system marginal price if 10¥/kWh and it produce a large flow from west and north to 
Tokyo causing congestion on almost all the interconnections. Congested transmission 
interconnections are represented with a red line in Figure 49. 
In the next step, it is necessary to reduce the system to individuate the E-I combination that 
has to be split. Following the rules previously described, Hokkaido and Tohoku area are 
reduce in a single area of type E, and similarly Shikoku is integrated with Kansai and 
Hokuriku with Chubu. The group Kansai- Shikoku is then integrated with the group 
Chubu-Hokuriku forming an area of type E, Chugoku can now be integrated in the group 
Hokuriku-Kansai-Shikoku-Chubu since an I-E connection is produced. The new area is an 
E type and can be integrated with Kyushu. As result, the total system is reduced in three 
main areas: Hokkaido-Tohoku, Tokyo and the West as represented in Figure 50. Following 
the algorithm proposed in this thesis, it is necessary to split the market in three submarkets: 
one for the north, one for the west and one for Tokyo. 
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Figure 50: System reduction 
At this point, it is possible to solve the auction for each submarket in which the original 
market was divided after the introduction of the virtual bids. Figure 51 represents the final 
market solution. 
 
Figure 51: Final solution 
Tokyo shows the highest market price at 11¥/kWh, the west part of Japan has the lowest 
market price at 9.8 ¥/kWh. The congestion is relived in all the transmission lines. 
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5.2.6 Tests and performance 
To describe the algorithm process, simple examples were introduced in the previous 
section.  
In practice, the algorithm has to be utilized for larger systems with several areas and 
thousands of orders. A test system with 16 areas, 15 interconnection and 80,000 of orders 
was developed. The algorithm was translated in a Fortran program and the program was 
performed on the test system to prove the performances. Using an Itanium 1GHz CPU, the 
calculation terminated in 0.01 sec.  
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5.3  Conclusions 
 
The transmission congestion problem for forward market and spot market was approached. 
The objective is to find a method that at the same time inform the participant about the 
congestion condition with strong price signal and ensure the optimal utilization of the 
transmission network. Introducing the concept of area and submarkets, the market split is 
implemented for both forward market and spot market. In the forward market, a sequential 
auction algorithm is implemented; the spot market is cleared with a single auction 
mechanism.  
To improve the calculation performance, a novel algorithm that determined the congested 
areas and the necessary submarket is proposed. Tests show the high performances of the 
proposed method. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusions 
 
The research developed in this thesis has proposed practical solutions for the deregulated 
market. The thesis focused on three main problems, which are consequence of the 
liberalization of the electricity industry; the first one is the strategic biding of market 
players, the second one is the scheduling problem for PPS in a multi-area system, the third 
one is how to manage the transmission congestion in spot and forward market. 
After an analysis of the market structures and market rules that are implemented worldwide 
it was clear that the introduction of deregulation changed the role of players and the relation 
between them; nevertheless the rules that govern the electricity are the same. For this 
reason this thesis evaluated the basic planning tools for power system as unit commitment 
and optimal power flow and applied them with the appropriated variation to the new 
environment. 
The unit commitment problem is a complex mixed-integer non-linear problem in which the 
schedule of the available generating unit is decided. It has a long history and several 
techniques were applied in the past. This thesis proposed the decommissioning approach (a 
combination of dynamic programming and quadratic programming); the proposed method 
is fast and produces always a feasible solution. Based on the unit-commitment 
decommissioning algorithm, this thesis approached the bid development problems. With the 
same algorithm it is possible to build cost base bid, price base bid and multi-products 
multi-market bids depending of the needs of the market player that utilize it. With the 
proposed tools, market participants are able to develop an optimal strategy based on their 
particular needs and position in the market. 
This thesis proposes also another application of the unit commitment algorithm. After 
investigating the position of PPS in the Japanese market, it was clear that the PPS 
scheduling process was different from the utilities one. PPS had the possibility to send 
electricity in several control areas from the same generating units, nevertheless different 
wheeling fees and losses were applied depending on the receiving area. A model to 
optimize the schedule under these conditions is developed.  
To develop a price base bid, it is indispensable to forecast the market price for the biding 
time frame. For this reason, this thesis proposes a neural network algorithm to forecast the 
market price. After a deep analysis of the correlation of the market price and other factors 
such as the power demand, the fuel price and so on, it was clear that the peak demand was 
the key parameter that influences the market price. The thesis proposes a forecasting 
method that integrates both the demand forecasting and the price forecasting. For both the 
calculations, a three layer neural network is implemented. 
Several countries adopted an optimal power flow based approach to the transmission 
congestion problem, PJM and all the other markets that implemented a nodal (or locational 
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marginal) price, decided to base the market price on the optimal power flow calculation 
with several simplification. Japan follows another path. Since the Japanese transmission 
network is particular strong inside the control areas (there is no congestion problems) but 
week in the interconnections among control areas, it was simpler to use a market split 
approach to the congestion problem. This thesis develops an algorithm to calculate the 
market solution based on the market split theory. The algorithm has the advantage to ensure 
an optimal solution without using linear programming or other time consuming calculation. 
The algorithm is deployed in the current JEPX and is utilized daily.  
Starting from the concept of market split usual implemented for spot markets (single 
auction market), this thesis extend the concept to the forward market and continuous 
auction proposing a method to inform market participants about congestion problems not 
only in the spot market but also in the forward market. To check the efficiency of the 
method, a simulation platform was developed and several simulations with professionals in 
the electric field were done. 
 
Future researches should be done to solve problems still open; in particular the 
environmental problem was not approached in this thesis but it is possible to forecast that in 
the near future emission constraints will influence the generation business in the long and 
short term prospective. The green house gas emission constraints have to be integrated in 
the unit commitment in general and in the bid strategy development in particular to obtain a 
generation dispatch that minimize not only the production cost but also the environment 
impact.  
In addition, this thesis focuses mainly on the wholesale and the generation side of the 
market, nevertheless retail and demand side have also a fundamental role in the price 
driving and transmission congestion. Demand side bid strategies development and demand 
schedule are subjects that should be investigated in the future. 
The proposed approach for strategic bidding is a deterministic one. Nevertheless, a 
generation company may need to evaluate the risk and, in some case, to minimize the risk 
associate with a strategic bidding. A stochastic approach to the strategic bidding may be 
developed in the future.   
 
To conclude I would like to stress once again on the five main points that this thesis 
propose: 
 
1) A neural network method to forecast the market spot price. The strength of the method 
comes from the integration of the forecasting of the day-ahead peak electricity demand 
in the algorithm. 
 
2) A unit commitment base approach to the optimal strategic bid that allowed the player to 
develop a price base bid or a cost base bid or a multi-products multi markets bid 
depending of the market condition and the position of the player itself 
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3) An application of the unit commitment method to the Japanese PPS scheduling problem. 
To ensure an optimal utilization of the resources a multi-area approach that considers 
losses, transmission constraints and wheeling fees was developed.  
 
4) A transmission congestion method for electricity forward market, based on the concept 
of hubs and price difference among hubs, which produces an efficient market signal for 
market participants.  
 
5) A market split base congestion management algorithm for spot market that ensure an 
optimal market solution and high calculation time performances. The algorithm is based 
on an algebraic formulation and can be applied to radial or loops networks. 
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Appendix 1 The DC power flow 
In the congestion management chapter, it was assumed that a simple calculation could be 
performed to calculate the power flow on each line in the network once that the injection 
and the extraction quantities at each node are given. 
In reality, the situation is more complex and several approximations have to be introduced 
to obtain a simple algebraic relation between injection and power flow. It was considered 
that the so-called DC approximation could be considered consistent with the needs of the 
market: a power flow solution that respects the reality but at the same time can be 
performed in few milliseconds.  
 
General formulation 
The real power flowing from node 1 to node 2 along line i is given by: 
( )( ) ( )212121212112 sincos δδδδ −⋅⋅⋅Ω+−⋅⋅−= VVVVVGz ii  
, where 
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+
=Ω  
Ri = line resistance 
Xi = line reactance 
V1 and V2 = voltage magnitude at node 1 and 2 respectively 
δ1 andδ2 = voltage phase at node 1 and 2 respectively 
If it is assumed that the phase difference between nodes is small and the voltage at each 
node is close to 1 in a per unit system, it is possible to reduce to a simplified form. 
( )2112 δδ −⋅Ω= iz  
since  
( )
( ) ( )2121
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δδδδ
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Lines flow and bus injection function 
The power flow has to respect the balance equation of energy. For each node the total 
injection minus the total extraction has to be equal zero. 
zAy T ⋅=  
,where 
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y  = vector of bus injection 
A= topology matrix that connect node and lines (elements are 0, 1,-1) 
z = vector of line flow 
 
Appling the approximation introduced in the previous section, it is possible rewrite the 
balance equation as follow: 
δ⋅⋅Ω⋅= AAy T  
,where 
δ⋅⋅Ω= Az  
Solving for δ and rewriting the power flow as function of the system injection y: 
yHz ⋅=  
,where  
( ) 1−⋅Ω⋅⋅Ω= AAAH T  
H is called the transfer admittance matrix. 
 
Some consideration 
The assumption of small difference of phases between nodes has a strong impact on the 
problem formulation. It is evident that as consequence of the formulation the lines are 
considered as lossless.  
Some author propose to approximate the losses as function of the resistance and the square 
of the power flow: 
( ) ( )
2
1cos
2
21
21
δδ
δδ
−
−≈−  
zRzL
T ⋅⋅=  
Integrating this equation in the power flow one it is possible to rewrite H including the 
losses part. 
( ) ( ) 111 −−− ⋅Ω⋅⋅Ω⋅⋅Ω⋅⋅⋅Ω⋅⋅⋅= AAARAAAARH TTT  
The assumption may still have a strong effect in particular in low voltage network where 
phase difference is not so small. For this thesis objective, in which we are applying the 
power flow calculation for a high voltage transmission network with an approximated 
topology, the assumptions are completely consistent. 
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Appendix 2 Demonstrations 
In section 5.2 it was affirmed that the existence of an export area in system ensures the 
existence of at least and import area and vice versa. It was also affirmed that split the 
market between two export areas is not producing a decrees of congestion. In this appendix 
these two affirmations are demonstrated. 
 
Theorem 1 
If in a system there is an export node, in the same system one or more import node exists. 
 
Demonstration: 
Let suppose that area m is an export one, for the definition of export area: 
,where n is the total number of areas in the system. 
For the reciprocity of the power flow on a line: 
The power balance of the system implicate that: 
It is possible to integrate the reciprocity equation and the balance equation in: 
and rewrite it as: 
If one of the terms of the equation is bigger than 0 in value as it was supposed under the 
condition of the existence of an export area then at least one term has to be lower than 0 to 
satisfy the equation. This implicates that exist at least a area k for which the flowing 
equation is respected. 
Since the equation corresponds to the definition of import area, it was demonstrated that the 
existence of an export area in a system implicates the existence of one or more import 
areas. 
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Theorem 2 
If in a system an export node, is connected to another export node the relief of the 
congestion on the connecting branch will not relief the congestion on the other branch 
connected to the node. 
Figure 52: Variable definition 
Demonstration: 
Let’s considered the area m to be an export node and line 1 is congested. For the definition 
it can be affirm that: 
for the balance condition at the area: 
To relief the congestion on line 1 the power flowing on it has to be reduce to the limit 
capacity, in formula 
 
It is possible now to rewrite the balance condition as: 
Since the quantity flowing from line 1 in area m decrease due to the transmission 
congestion, the quantity dispatched inside the area increases. 
As consequence it can be affirmed that  
Integrating the balance condition and the above equation: 
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The equation can be rewritten as follow: 
 
Similarly to the previous assumption about the production in the area, it is possible to 
affirm that the import is also increase 
As consequence 
This implicate that 
but this implicates that there is at least a line k that is congested in the direction out of area 
m.  
It was prove that the splitting two export areas in two independent submarkets implicate an 
increasing of congestion on lines with flow out of the areas itself. 
∑∑∑∑ −>−
in
in
out
out
in
in
out
out
k
limit
k
k
k
limit
k
flow
k
k
k
flow QQQQ
~~
( ) ( )∑∑ −>−
in
inin
out
outout
k
k
limit
k
flow
k
k
limit
k
flow QQQQ
~~
flow
k
flow
k inin
QQ ≥
~
0
~
≥− limitk
flow
k inin
QQ
( ) 0~ >−∑
out
out
out
k
k
limtflow
k QQ
 
 Appendix  
-102- 
Appendix 3 Data for Market simulation 
Bid data utilized in chapter 5 are described in Table 8. Quantities are expressed in MWh/h 
and price in ¥/kWh. Negative quantities are associated to a buy bid positive to a sell bid. 
Table 8: Bid Data 
price quantity price quantity price quantity
Hokkaido 1 10 100 11.5 124 12 140
Hokkaido 2 9 -130 10 -80 11 50
Tohoku 1 9 100 9.8 115 10.1 140
Tohoku 2 8.6 -100 9 -50 10 -10
Tohoku 3 8.7 50 9 130 9.8 170
Tohoku 4 9.3 85 9.7 95 9.9 100
Tokyo 1 9.5 -200 9.7 -180 10 -150
Tokyo 2 9.9 -200 10.1 -150 10.3 -40
Tokyo 3 11 -200 11.2 -50 11.8 -20
Tokyo 4 10.8 100 11.3 130 12 180
Tokyo 5 10 115 13 170 15 200
Tokyo 6 10 -130 10.8 -100 11.3 -90
Tokyo 7 12 -147 13 -100 15 -90
Tokyo 8 11 200 12 250 12.3 300
Tokyo 9 14 -100 14.2 -80 14.3 -70
Tokyo 10 9.8 -100 10.2 -98 12 130
Tokyo 11 14 100 14.3 140 14.8 180
Tokyo 12 12 -140 13 -100 13.2 -50
Tokyo 13 13 100 13.5 150 13.8 200
Chubu 1 9 100 10 124 11 140
Chubu 2 9 -130 10 -80 11 50
Chubu 3 8 100 8.8 115 9.1 140
Chubu 4 8.6 -100 9 -50 10 -10
Chubu 5 8 50 8.7 130 8.8 170
Chubu 6 9 85 9.2 95 9.5 100
Chubu 7 9.5 -200 9.7 -130 10 -100
Chubu 8 9.9 -100 10.1 -80 10.3 -40
Hokuriku 1 11 -100 11.2 -50 11.8 -20
Kansai 1 9.8 100 10.4 130 10.6 180
Kansai 2 8 115 10 170 11 200
Kansai 3 10 -130 10.8 -100 11.3 -90
Kansai 4 11 -117 12 -100 13 -90
Kansai 5 11 200 12 250 12.3 300
Kansai 6 14 -100 14.2 -80 14.3 -70
Kansai 7 8.8 -100 9.8 80 11 130
Kansai 8 14 100 14.3 140 14.8 180
Kansai 9 9 100 10.5 124 11 140
Kansai 10 9 -130 10 -80 11 50
Shikoku 1 8.5 100 8.8 115 9.1 140
Shikoku 2 8.6 -100 9 -50 10 -10
Chugoku 1 8.7 50 9 130 9.8 170
Chugoku 2 9.3 85 9.7 95 9.9 100
Chugoku 3 9.5 -200 9.7 -130 9.8 -100
Chugoku 4 9.9 -100 10.1 -80 10.3 -40
Chugoku 5 10 -100 10.2 -50 10.8 -20
Kyushu 1 9.8 100 10.5 130 11 180
Kyushu 2 9 115 12 170 13 200
Kyushu 3 9.4 -130 10 -100 11 -90
Kyushu 4 11 -117 12 -100 13 -90
Kyushu 5 9.8 200 11 250 11.3 300
block 1 block 2 block 3
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The data are processed as described in chapter 5 and the solution for each player is 
described in Table 9. It is clear as due to the transmission constraints, the position of several 
players change drastically from the solution without congestion to the solution with 
congestion.  
Table 9: Trading Result for each player 
Quantity Price Quantity Price
Hokkaido 1 100 10 5 10
Hokkaido 2 -80 10 -80 10
Tohoku 1 115 10 115 10
Tohoku 2 -10 10 -10 10
Tohoku 3 170 10 170 10
Tohoku 4 100 10 100 10
Tokyo 1 -150 10 0 11
Tokyo 2 -150 10 0 11
Tokyo 3 -200 10 -200 11
Tokyo 4 0 10 100 11
Tokyo 5 115 10 115 11
Tokyo 6 -130 10 -90 11
Tokyo 7 -147 10 -147 11
Tokyo 8 0 10 62 11
Tokyo 9 -100 10 -100 11
Tokyo 10 -98 10 0 11
Tokyo 11 0 10 0 11
Tokyo 12 -140 10 -140 11
Tokyo 13 0 10 0 11
Chubu 1 124 10 100 9.8
Chubu 2 -80 10 -80 9.8
Chubu 3 140 10 140 9.8
Chubu 4 -10 10 -10 9.8
Chubu 5 170 10 170 9.8
Chubu 6 100 10 100 9.8
Chubu 7 -100 10 -100 9.8
Chubu 8 -80 10 -100 9.8
Hokuriku 1 -100 10 -100 9.8
Kansai 1 100 10 65 9.8
Kansai 2 170 10 115 9.8
Kansai 3 -130 10 -130 9.8
Kansai 4 -117 10 -117 9.8
Kansai 5 0 10 0 9.8
Kansai 6 -100 10 -100 9.8
Kansai 7 80 10 51 9.8
Kansai 8 0 10 0 9.8
Kansai 9 100 10 100 9.8
Kansai 10 -80 10 -80 9.8
Shikoku 1 140 10 140 9.8
Shikoku 2 -10 10 -10 9.8
Chugoku 1 170 10 144 9.8
Chugoku 2 100 10 95 9.8
Chugoku 3 0 10 -100 9.8
Chugoku 4 -80 10 -100 9.8
Chugoku 5 -100 10 -100 9.8
Kyushu 1 100 10 36 9.8
Kyushu 2 115 10 115 9.8
Kyushu 3 -100 10 -100 9.8
Kyushu 4 -117 10 -117 9.8
Kyushu 5 200 10 73 9.8
Solution without
transmission limits
Solution with
transmission limits
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It is possible to see that because of the congestion, the sold quantity in the west part decries 
and the bought increase. 
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